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Symbols of statehood: military 
industrialization and 
public discourse in India 
DAVID KINSELLA AND JUGDEP S. CHIMA* 
Abstract. This article examines the forces driving the pursuit of military production capacity 
in India, including those behind the Indian nuclear and space programmes. We are mainly 
interested in whether symbolic motivations regularly find expression in the public discourse. 
We review all articles on the subject of weapons development and production appearing in 
India Today from May 1977 to April 1999. There are three closely interrelated yet dis 
tinguishable concerns in the public discourse that we consider symbolic: that military 
industrialization is a means of asserting India's autonomy in international affairs, that it is a 
means of establishing India's international status and prestige, and that it serves to enhance 
India's self-image. We contend that the symbolic motivations are a prominent force behind the 
military industrialization process in India. The precise form that symbolic motivations take 
vary?some statements seem to have more symbolic content than others?but, as a whole, 
such references are not rare or isolated. Our findings suggest that symbolism can be an 
important component of the quest for an indigenous arms-production capacity, and perhaps 
other elements of Statebuilding as well. 
The Bharatiya Janata Party proclaimed 16 May 1998 a 'day of prestige'. India had 
tested five nuclear devices that week and the ruling party had cause for celebration. 
In justifying the tests, India's national security received frequent mention, but more 
conspicuous was the symbolism embodied by the detonations. Raja Ramanna, 
former head of India's Atomic Energy Commission, stated that 'we no longer need 
to quote our ancient literature to feel proud', while another Indian commentator 
referred to the blasts as an 
'explosion of self-esteem'. Bal Thackeray, leader of one 
of the BJP's coalition partners, went so far as to say that 'we have to prove that we 
are not eunuchs'. Another boost to Indian self-esteem occurred one year later when 
the Indian Space Research Organisation successfully test-launched the Agni-II 
intermediate-range missile. At that time Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
described the Agni as 'a symbol of resurgent India', and reassured the nation that 
'Yes, we will stand on our own feet'.1 
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies 
Association-Midwest Region, Cleveland, 4-6 October 1997. Our thanks to Jyotirindra Das Gupta, 
Sabita Manian, Mustapha Pasha, and Paul Wallace for comments and suggestions, and to Anita Dey 
and Karl Riber for research assistance. 
1 The quotes are from, respectively, 'We Should Feel Proud', The Times of India, 16 May 1998; 
Sabyasachi Mitra, 'Newspapers and People Are Ecstatic Over Tests', India-West, 15 May 1998; and 
'Over 2,000 Km Range Agni-II Successfully Test-Fired', The Times of India, 12 April 1999. Symbol 
ism was also an element in Pakistan's follow-on nuclear tests: The Muslim, a conservative Pakistani 
daily, congratulated its military for having 'defied the high priests of the New World Order'. See John 
Ward Anderson and Kamran Khan, 'Pakistan: "We Are a Nuclear Power" ', Washington Post, 30 
May 1998. 
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Symbols are an important feature of social interaction. Things we say, things we 
do, things we possess often have symbolic meaning for ourselves and for those with 
whom we come in contact. Similarly for states and international interaction: there 
are certain national characteristics and forms of state behaviour which seem to be 
infused with a good deal of symbolic significance. Possession of nuclear weapons 
capability is probably the best example. But also important to states is the possession 
of advanced conventional weapons, and even more so the capacity to manufacture 
them. In this article we want to document the perceived importance of India's 
conventional weapons programmes as a symbol of Indian statehood. 
Symbols, particularly those that contribute to a state's status and prestige, are 
widely acknowledged to motivate state behaviour. India's nuclear tests, for example, 
were 
'only ornamentations but necessary in the modern world'.2 Unfortunately, 
reliable empirical indicators of symbolic motivating forces such as status and 
prestige do not seem to have captured the imagination of those engaged in rigorous 
qualitative or quantitative measurement and analysis. That is an exceedingly difficult 
enterprise in any event. We are, after all, alluding to matters of cognition, and 
abandonment of the state as unit of analysis?the unit favoured by realism and 
certain other approaches to international relations?is probably a minimum require 
ment for any empirical analysis that takes seriously the various theoretical disputes 
about the nature and importance of symbolic motivations in international relations. 
It might be useful to scrutinize statements by policymakers for evidence of 
symbolic motivations for their actions. But this does not get us in the clear if it is 
military-related behaviour we want to explain. As Suchman and Eyre point out, 
'military procurement reflects an essentially ritualistic belief in modern weaponry as 
a distinguishing emblem of modern nations; unfortunately, since rational military 
planning is another such emblem..., these nonrational motives are unlikely to 
receive formal acknowledgment'.3 Suchman and Eyre are sceptical that policymakers 
will actually admit to being motivated by such things as status and prestige. 
Therefore, they suggest proceeding directly to an empirical examination of the state's 
participation in international organizations and other institutional forms, since these 
are the repositories of world-level cultural practices which purportedly constitute 
state preferences and identity.4 
Although we are mindful of the potential bias against overt expression of symbolic, 
'nonrational' motivations for military-related behaviour, we think it premature to 
disregard public discourse merely on the basis of these suspicions. Thus we have set 
a straightforward empirical task for ourselves in this article. We examine the 
rationales given for India's pursuit of an indigenous production capacity in con 
ventional and nuclear weaponry. We are particularly interested in whether symbolic 
motivations, such as international status and prestige, regularly find expression in 
the public discourse, so we concentrate our discussion on these sorts of rationales. 
But other motivations?non-symbolic ones?are plainly evident in the materials we 
2 
Raja Ramanna, quoted in Y. P. Rajesh, 'Top Nuke Scientist Drinks Wine to Celebrate Tests', India 
West, 15 May 1998. 3 Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, 'Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social 
Construction of Weapons Proliferation', Sociological Forum, 7 (1992), p. 151. 4 See also Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional 
Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
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Symbols are an important feature of social interaction. Things we say, things we
do, things we possess often have symbolic meaning for ourselves and for those with
whom we come in contact. Similarly for states and international interaction: there
are certain national characteristics and forms of state behaviour which seem to be
infused with a good deal of symbolic significance. Possession of nuclear weapons
capability is probably the best example. But also important to states is the possession
of advanced conventional weapons, and even more so the capacity to manufacture
them. In this article we want to document the perceived importance of India's
conventional weapons programmes as a symbol of Indian statehood.
Symbols, particularly those that contribute to a state's status and prestige, are
widely acknowledged to motivate state behaviour. India's nuclear tests, for example,
were 'only ornamentations but necessary in the modern world'.2 Unfortunately,
reliable empirical indicators of symbolic motivating forces such as status and
prestige do not s em to have captured the imagination of those engaged in rigorous
qualitative or quantitative measurement and analysis. That is an exceedingly difficult
enterprise in any event. We are, after all, alluding to matters of cognition, and
abandonment of the state as unit of analysis-the unit favoured by realism and
certain other approaches to international relations-is probably a mini um require-
ment for any empirical analysis that takes seriously the various theoretical disputes
about the nature and importance of symbolic motivations in international relations.
It might be useful to scrutinize statements by policymakers for evidence of
symbolic motivations for their actions. But this does not get us in the clear if it is
military-related behaviour we want to explain. As Suchman and Eyre point out,
'military procurement reflects an essentially ritualistic belief in modern weaponry as
a distinguishing emblem of modern nations; unfortunately, since rational military
planning is another such emblem ... , these nonrational motives are unlikely to
receive formal acknowledgment'.3 Suchman and Eyre are sceptical that policymakers
will actually admit to being motivated by such things as status and prestige.
Therefore, they suggest proceeding directly to an empirical examination of the state's
participation in international organizations and other institutional forms, since these
are the repositories of world-level cultural practices which purportedly constitute
state preferences and identity.4
Although we are mindful of the potential bias against overt expression of symbolic,
'nonrational' motivations for military-related behaviour, we think it premature to
disregard public discourse merely on the basis of these suspicions. Thus we have set
a straightforward empirical task for ourselves in this article. We examine the
rationales given for India's pursuit of an indigenous production capacity in con-
ventional and nuclear weaponry. We are particularly interested in whether symbolic
motivations, such as international status and prestige, regularly find expression in
the public discourse, so we concentrate our discussion on these sorts of rationales.
But other motivations-non-symbolic ones-are plainly evident in the materials we
2 Raja Ramanna, quoted in Y ~ Rajesh, 'Top Nuke Scientist Drinks Wine to Celebrate Tests', India-
West, 15 May 1998.
3 Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, 'Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social
Construction of Weapons Proliferation', Sociological Forum, 7 (1992), p. 151.
4 See also Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional
Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach', in Peter 1. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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examine, so we can also give some indication of the relative prominence of symbolic 
motivations. 
To accomplish our task, we have systematically reviewed all articles on the subject 
of weapons development and production appearing in India Today, India's most 
popular news magazine, from May 1977 through to April 1999. We don't equate 
India Today with Indian public discourse; no single information source can be said 
to truly represent the many attitudes, ideologies, meanings, and styles of com 
munication that comprise a public discourse, especially in a society as ethnically and 
culturally diverse as India. But we do believe that India Today is the best single 
source available for capturing the imagery of the burgeoning middle and upper 
middle classes in India, and is superior to any other source for our purposes. That 
said, similar representations of Indian public discourse on military industrialization 
do emerge from less exhaustive analyses of another Indian news magazine, Frontline, 
and two daily newspapers, The Hindustan Times and The Hindu. We offer a 
comparison of these sources at the end of the article. 
Military industrialization in India 
Observers of military industrialization in the Third World typically highlight the 
'rational' or 'instrumental' ends toward which indigenous arms production is 
directed. A state acquires arms in order to improve its immediate security vis-?-vis 
rival states or more generally to enhance its position in a regional security complex. 
Domestically produced arms have the added benefit of guarding against the 
manipulation of weapons supplies, including spare parts, which might otherwise be 
undertaken by foreign suppliers with their own policy objectives. Domestic arms 
production has also been given an explicitly economic rationale. States obviously 
need not purchase from abroad what they build themselves, so arms production is 
viewed as means of conserving foreign exchange. If there is sufficient demand for 
arms exports, domestic arms production can even generate foreign exchange. In 
addition, military industrialization is sometimes pursued for purposes of techno 
logical development and spin-off to the civilian sector of the economy. 
In the case of India, the most obvious impetus behind weapons production is the 
country's immediate security environment, especially its strategic relationships with 
Pakistan and China. Territorial disputes over Kashmir with Pakistan and along the 
Himalayan border with China are complicated further by religious and ideological 
differences. Throughout the period of Indian independence these have generated 
high levels of hostility and several overt military conflicts. Even when relations with 
Pakistan and China are relatively quiescent, India has remained attentive to these 
states' arms acquisitions: what they import, what they produce, what they try to 
produce. Levels of regional hostility and levels of regional armament explain, in 
large part, why India has acquired advanced weaponry for its armed forces. 
While India's immediate security needs have been interpreted as requiring well 
armed defence forces, on strictly military grounds there should be no reason to 
prefer domestically produced weaponry over imports, assuming comparable per 
formance characteristics. But there are reasons both to prefer and not to prefer 
domestic production on economic grounds. In his extensive and balanced study of 
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examine, so we can also give some indication of the relative prominence of symbolic
motivations.
To accomplish our task, we have systematically reviewed all articles on the subject
of weapons development and production appearing in India Today, India's most
popular news magazine, from May 1977 through to April 1999. We don't equate
India Today with Indian public discourse; no single information source can be said
to truly represent the many attitudes, ideologies, meanings, and styles of com-
munication that comprise a public discourse, especially in a society as ethnically and
culturally diverse as India. But we do believe that India Today is the best single
source available for capturing the imagery of the burgeoning middle and upper-
middle classes in India, and is superior to any other source for our purposes. That
said, similar representations of Indian public discourse on military industrialization
do emerge from less exhaustive analyses of another Indian news magazine, Frontline,
and t o daily newspapers, The Hindustan Times and The Hindu. We offer a
comparison of these sources at the end of the article.
Military industrialization in India
Observers of military industrialization in the Third World typically highlight the
'rational' or 'instrumental' ends toward which indigenous arms production is
directed. A state acquires arms in order to improve its i mediate security vis-a-vis
rival states or more generally to enhance its position in a regional security complex.
Domestically produced arms have the added benefit of guarding against the
manipulation of weapons supplies, including spare parts, which might otherwise be
undertaken by foreign suppliers with their own policy objectives. Domestic arms
production has also been given an explicitly economic rationale. States obviously
need not purchase from abroad what they build themselves, so arms production is
viewed as means of conserving foreign exchange. If there is sufficient demand for
arms exports, domestic arms production can even generate foreign exchange. In
addition, military industrialization is sometimes pursued for purposes of techno-
logical development and spin-off to the civilian sector of the economy.
In the case of India, the most obvious impetus behind weapons production is the
country's immediate security environment, especially its strategic relationships with
Pakistan and China. Territorial disputes over Kashmir with Pakistan and along the
Himalayan border with China are complicated further by religious and ideological
differences. Throughout the period of Indian independence these have generated
high levels of hostility and several overt military conflicts. Even when relations with
Pakistan and China are relatively quiescent, India has remained attentive to these
states' arms acquisitions: what they import, what they produce, what they try to
produce. Levels of regional hostility and levels of regional armament explain, in
large part, why India has acquired advanced weaponry for its armed forces.
While India's immediate security needs have been interpreted as requiring well-
armed defence forces, on strictly military grounds there should be no reason to
prefer domestically produced weaponry over imports, assuming comparable per-
formance characteristics. But there are reasons both to prefer and not to prefer
domestic production on economic grounds. In his extensive and balanced study of
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Indian security policy, Thomas has noted that a policy of indigenous weapons 
production 'would mean a substantial increase in the scientific and technological 
knowledge of the country with attendant benefits for the civilian sector as well'.5 To 
be sure, the pursuit of 'military-led industrialization' is recognized far more explicitly 
in the academic literature than it is acknowledged by Indian statesmen. Indigenous 
production of weaponry would seem to demand something other than an economic 
rationale, especially in a democracy like India. Still, many analysts do agree that part 
of what drives military industrialization in India and elsewhere in the Third World is 
the belief that arms production will promote development in adjacent sectors of the 
national economy. Of course, state leaders may be wrong?and much of the 
literature endeavours to show them the errors of their ways?but '[t]he skepticism of 
academics in industrialized countries notwithstanding, the belief remains wide 
spread that such programs can provide tangible economic and technological benefits 
as well as enhanced military security'.6 
Indigenous weapons production in India has also sometimes been justified as a 
means of conserving foreign exchange that would otherwise go to foreign purchases, 
but in almost all cases the policy of import substitution has failed to measure up to 
expectations. The problem is not unique to India. Scarce resources and the inability 
of Third World armed forces to absorb large quantities of domestically produced 
weapons makes for very high unit costs, in which case importing weapons of even 
superior quality can be the cheaper alternative. Thomas has found that licensed 
production has been increasingly favoured in India, especially by economic planners. 
They recognize 'the need to strike an optimum balance between the cost and quality 
of weaponry; this is best obtained in the long run through both external techno 
logical transfers and domestic production'.7 Here too there are costs, since licensing 
involves both the importation of parts and machinery as well as the payment of 
royalties. Still, the hope is that this paves a way for indigenization, a course that in 
the end may be less costly than an attempt to indigenize cold turkey. 
There are other reasons why India builds weapons, not unrelated to its security 
environment or industrial development. According to Katz, '[t]he most important 
factor driving LDCs to produce arms can be summarized quite easily: autonomy, that 
is, freedom of action in the domestic and international spheres'.8 Actual or potential 
threats to national security are exacerbated when states find themselves dependent on 
others for defence. India, having experienced arms embargoes (for example, those 
imposed by the United States during the 1965 and 1971 conflicts with Pakistan), 
bristles at the thought of lasting arms dependence. As Indira Gandhi put it, 'We want 
5 
Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 6 Ken Conca, 'Third World Military Industrialization and the Evolving Security System', in Wayne 
Sandholtz et al. (eds.), The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 143. Thomas concludes that 'the growth of Indian 
military capabilities is, to a certain extent, unrelated to Indian threat perceptions and tends to be an 
autonomous trend based on civilian technological growth'. See Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 
p. 291. 
7 See Thomas, Indian Security Policy, pp. 246-7, 251-2; also Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: 
Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Timothy D. 
Hoyt, 'Rising Regional Powers: New Perspectives on Indigenous Defense Industries and Military 
Capability in the Developing World', Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University (1997). 8 James Everett Katz, 'Understanding Arms Production in Developing Countries', in James Everett 
Katz (ed.), Arms Production in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 4-5. 
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royalties. Still, the hope is that this paves a way for indigenization, a course that in
the end may be less costly than an attempt to indigenize cold turkey.
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bristles at the thought of lasting arms dependence. As Indira Gandhi put it, ' e want
5 Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
6 Ken Conca, 'Third World Military Industrialization and the Evolving Security System', in Wayne
Sandholtz et al. (eds.), The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 143. Thomas concludes that 'the growth of Indian
military capabilities is, to a certain extent, unrelated to Indian threat perceptions and tends to be an
autonomous trend based on civilian technological growth'. See Thomas, Indian Security Policy,
p.291.
7 See Thomas, Indian Security Policy, pp. 246-7, 251-2; also Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal:
Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Timothy D.
Hoyt, 'Rising Regional Powers: New Perspectives on Indigenous Defense Industries and Military
Capability in the Developing World', Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University (1997).
8 James Everett Katz, 'Understanding Arms Production in Developing Countries', in James Everett
Katz (ed.), Arms Production in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 4-5.
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India to be self-reliant and to strengthen its independence so that it cannot be 
pressurized by anybody'.9 Indian independence in defence policy is enhanced by an 
indigenous arms production capacity, particularly the capacity to initiate or expand 
production in a pinch, as well as the capacity to maintain existing systems. 
According to the Ministry of Defence, 'Modernization of arms and equipment 
and a maximum degree of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the shortest possible 
time have been the major objectives in our defence production effort. ... No free 
nation ... can afford to ignore the imperative need to maintain constant preparedness 
to defend [against] any threat to its borders'.10 Self-sufficiency in weapons pro 
curement has taken on a degree of significance beyond diminishing the impact of 
arms embargoes during wartime; it has become an integral feature of India's stated 
policy of nonalignment. Principles of nonalignment have been adhered to more 
rigidly at some times and not others?Indira Gandhi's foreign policy vis-?-vis the 
Soviet Union falling into the latter category. But the desire to remain aloof from 
the Cold War competition which entangled so many other Third World states was 
the closest thing to an Indian strategic doctrine. With the Cold War over, the policy 
of nonalignment has less resonance, but self-sufficiency in arms production, and 
independence more generally, still have claims on the Indian imagination. 
Beyond immediate security imperatives and industrial development, the posses 
sion of indigenous weapons production capacity has taken on symbolic importance 
for India. Foreign policy under Indira Gandhi has received much attention on this 
score, and the Pokhran nuclear test in 1974 epitomized India's quest for inter 
national recognition. In the opinion of one of Gandhi's biographers, Pokhran 'was 
no more than a gesture of independence and a bid for inexpensive prestige'.11 
William Brands, long-time observer of India's role in world affairs, detected the 
symbolic motivations behind India's nuclear programme well before the nuclear 
explosion occurred: 'With each of the first Chinese test explosions there was a new 
demand by some Indians that their country produce similar weapons. The demands 
often seemed as much concerned with Indian prestige as with security'. He adds that 
'The call for an Indian nuclear force also reflected a mood that the country should 
depend more on itself and less on outsiders'.12 Sisir Gupta, an Indian diplomat and 
academic, in 1965 referred to India as the 'sixth Power in a world where only five are 
recognized to be great' and suggested that India could 'either enter the club by 
defying the world and making a bomb or see to it that the bomb as a status symbol 
loses its significance because of effective progress towards disarmament'. He was 
sceptical regarding the latter option because 'military capability remains the most 
important source of a country's status, prestige and power'.13 
9 Shashi Tharoor, Reasons of State: Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira 
Gandhi, 1966-1977 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), p. 88. 10 
Quoted in Hoyt, 'Rising Regional Powers' (our italics), p. 69. See also V. K. R. V. Rao, The Current 
Indian Crisis: Darkness Before Dawn (Allahabad: Vohra, 1984). 11 
Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (New Delhi: 
Sage, 1984), p. 59. See also Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy 
(New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 101, 106-7; Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal, pp. 187, 189. 12 H. W. Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston: Twayne, 1990), pp. 220-1. Smith 
suggests that Nehru too 'recognized how much political power was commensurate with nuclear 
weapons', despite a great deal of ambivalence about India's pursuing a nuclear option. See Smith, 
India's Ad Hoc Arsenal, pp. 179-80. 13 Sisir Gupta, India and the International System, edited by M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (New 
Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 243. 
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India to be self-reliant and to strengthen its independence so that it ca not be
pressurized by anybody'.9 Indian independence in defence policy is enhanced by an
indigenous arms production capacity, particularly the capacity to initiate or expand
production in a pinch, as well as the capacity to maintain existing systems.
According to the Ministry of Defence, ' odernization of arms and equipment
and a maxi um degree of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the shortest possible
time have been the major objectives in our defence production effort. . No free
nation .. can afford to ignore the imperative need to maintain constant preparedness
to defend [against] any threat to its borders' .10 Self-sufficiency in weapons pro-
curement has taken on a degree of significance beyond diminishing the impact of
arms embargoes during wartime; it has become an integral feature of India's stated
policy of nonalignment. Principles of nonalignment have been adhered to more
rigidly at some times and not others-Indira Gandhi's foreign policy vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union falling into the latter category. But the desire to remain aloof from
the Cold War competition which entangled so many other Third World states was
the closest thing to an Indian strategic doctrine. With the Cold War over, the policy
of nonalignment has less resonance, but self-sufficiency in arms production, and
independence more generally, still have claims on the Indian imagination.
Beyond i mediate security imperatives and industrial development, the posses-
sion of indigenous weapons production capacity has taken on symbolic importance
for India. Foreign policy under Indira Gandhi has received much attention on this
score, and the Pokhran nuclear test in 1974 epitomized India's quest for inter-
national recognition. In the opinion of one of Gandhi's biographers, Pokhran ' as
no more than a gesture of independence and a bid for inexpensive prestige'. 11
William Brands, long-time observer of India's role in world affairs, detected the
symbolic motivations behind India's nuclear programme well before the nuclear
explosion occurred: ' ith each of the first Chinese test explosions there was a new
demand by some Indians that their country produce similar weapons. The demands
often seemed as much concerned with Indian prestige as with security'. He adds that
'The call for an Indian nuclear force also reflected a mood that the country should
depend more on itself and less on outsiders'. 12 Sisir Gupta, an Indian diplomat and
academic, in 1965 referred to India as the 'sixth Power in a world where only five are
recognized to be great' and suggested that India could 'either enter the club by
defying the world and making a bomb or s e to it that the bomb as a status symbol
loses its significance because of effective progress towards disarmament'. He was
sceptical regarding the latter option because 'military capability remains the most
important source of a country's status, prestige and power' .13
9 Shashi Tharoor, Reasons of State: Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira
Gandhi, 1966-1977 (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), p. 88.
10 Quoted in Hoyt, 'Rising Regional Powers' (our italics), p. 69. See also V K. R. V Rao, The Current
Indian Crisis: Darkness Before Dawn (Allahabad: Vohra, 1984).
11 Surjit Mansingh, India's Searchfor Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982 (New Delhi:
Sage, 1984), p. 59. See also Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy
(New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 101, 106-7; Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal, pp. 187, 189.
12 H. W Brands, India and the United States: The Cold Peace (Boston: Twayne, 1990), pp. 220-1. Smith
suggests that Nehru too 'recognized how much political power was co mensurate with nuclear
weapons', despite a great deal of ambivalence about India's pursuing a nuclear option. See Smith,
India's Ad Hoc Arsenal, pp. 179-80.
13 Sisir Gupta, India and the International System, edited by M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (New
Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 243.
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In addition to enhancing India in the eyes of the international community, 
domestic weapons production seems to have been partly motivated by the desire to 
enhance India in the eyes of Indians themselves. Again, this is a recurrent theme in 
defence policy under Indira Gandhi. One concern has been with the scientific and 
industrial community. In a 1968 interview, Gandhi lamented that 'our intellectuals, 
our industrialists and businessmen do not yet feel proud of being Indians'.14 She 
would later justify the Pokhran test by the need 'for our scientists to know what they 
are capable of'.15 In 1992, Prime Minister Rao referred to the successful test (after 
several failures) of the augmented Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) as 'a morale booster 
for the scientific community'.16 After Agni-II was tested in May 1999, Vajpayee 
heralded the Indian scientific community as 'second to none in the world', while 
insisting that 'all of us can truly say with pride: Jai Vigyan [Hail Science]'.17 
The preoccupation with self-image has been extended to the whole of India as a 
nation. Without mentioning any specific weapons programmes, Gandhi once 
commented that 'while we must have arms to defend our country from any aggression, 
these arms, this military strength must be backed by conviction in our ideals and 
confidence in ourselves'.18 Commensurate with India's policy of nonalignment, she also 
wished for an Indian identity unmolested by Cold War politics: 'we wanted [India] to 
be able to grow in its own way?to choose its own direction, to choose its own 
personality'.19 There are nations, like India, that are 'sensitive, assertive and proud of 
their individual personalities. ... What is important is that we stand for ourselves'.20 
All of this suggests that there are multiple factors driving domestic weapons 
production in India, including the weapons-related nuclear and space programmes. 
India's immediate security environment, especially its enduring rivalry with Pakistan 
and its often hostile relations with China, is perhaps only the most obvious. India's 
defence programmes are also motivated by the hope that they will contribute to 
industrial development generally. And, most importantly for our purposes, military 
industrialization has symbolic meaning. It is perceived by Indian elites, and 
presumably by some non-elites, to enhance India's autonomy in foreign affairs, and 
ultimately its status and prestige in the international community. It is also seen to 
enhance the self-confidence of the scientific and technical community directly involved 
in weapons development and production, and even the self-image of the entire 
Indian nation. These themes resurface in our analysis of India Today. But first we 
turn to IR theory. 
Symbols and international relations theory 
Although there is little explicit in the realist literature regarding symbolic motiv 
ations behind the pursuit of indigenous arms production capacity, nuclear or non 
14 
Nayantara Pandit Sahgal, Indira Gandhi's Emergence and Style (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p. 40. 15 
Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 71. 16 Adish C. Aggarwala, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao: Scholar Prime Minister (New Delhi: Amish, 
1995), p. 121. 17 
'India Wants Peace Everywhere: PM', The Times of India, 27 May 1999. 18 Indira Gandhi, India: The Speeches and Reminiscences of Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India 
(Calcutta: Rupa, 1975), pp. 140-1. 19 
Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 88. 20 
Pupul Jayakar, Indira Gandhi: An Intimate Biography (New York: Pantheon, 1992), p. 255. 
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In addition to enhancing India in the eyes of the international community,
domestic weapons production s ems to have been partly motivated by the desire to
enhance India in the eyes of Indians themselves. Again, this is a recurrent theme in
defence policy under Indira Gandhi. One concern has been with the scientific and
industrial community. In a 1968 interview, Gandhi lamented that 'our intellectuals,
our industrialists and businessmen do not yet feel proud of being Indians'. 14 She
would later justify the Pokhran test by the need 'for our scientists to know what they
are capable Of'.15 In 1992, Prime Minister Rao referred to the successful test (after
several failures) of the augmented Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) as 'a morale booster
for the scientific community'.16 After Agni-II was tested in May 1999, Vajpayee
heralded the Indian scientific community as 'second to none in the world', while
insisting that 'all of us can truly say with pride: Jai Vigyan [Hail Science]' .17
The preoccupation with self-image has been extended to the whole of India as a
nation. Without mentioning any specific weapons programmes, Gandhi once
co mented that ' hile we must have arms to defend our country from any aggression,
these arms, this military strength must be backed by conviction in our ideals and
confidence in ourselves' .18 Co mensurate with India's policy of nonalignment, she also
wished for an Indian identity unmolested by Cold War politics: ' e wanted [India] to
be able to grow in its own way-to choose its own direction, to choose its own
personality'.19 There are nations, like India, that are 'sensitive, assertive and proud of
their individual personalities.. . What is important is that we stand for ourselves'. 20
All of this suggests that there are multiple factors driving domestic weapons
production in India, including the weapons-related nuclear and space programmes.
India's immediate security environment, especially its enduring rivalry with Pakistan
and its often hostile relations with China, is perhaps only the most obvious. India's
defence programmes are also motivated by the hope that they will contribute to
industrial development generally. And, most importantly for our purposes, military
industrialization has symbolic meaning. It is perceived by Indian elites, and
presumably by some non-elites, to enhance India's autonomy in foreign affairs, and
ultimately its status and prestige in the international community. It is also seen to
enhance the self-confidence of the scientific and technical community directly involved
in weapons development and production, and even the self-image of the entire
Indian nation. These themes resurface in our analysis of India Today. But first we
turn to IR theory.
Symbols and international relations theory
Although there is little explicit in the realist literature regarding symbolic motiv-
ations behind the pursuit of indigenous arms production capacity, nuclear or non-
14 Nayantara Pandit Sahgal, Indira Gandhi's Emergence and Style (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), p. 40.
15 Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 71.
16 Adish C. Aggarwala, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao: Scholar Prime Minister (New Delhi: Amish,
1995), p. 121.
17 'India Wants Peace Everywhere: PM', The Times of India, 27 May 1999.
18 Indira Gandhi, India: The Speeches and Reminiscences of Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India
(Calcutta: Rupa, 1975), pp. 140-1.
19 Tharoor, Reasons of State, p. 88.
20 Pupul Jayakar, Indira Gandhi: An Intimate Biography (New York: Pantheon, 1992), p. 255.
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nuclear, there is nothing in realist theory that is inconsistent with such a charac 
terization of Indian defence industrial policy. But a more serious lapse, something 
for which realism has been rightly criticized, is the failure to fully examine the source 
of those motivations (in a sense, preferences) and, more especially, the dynamic 
relationship between states as actors and the environment within which states 
interact.21 The question neglected by realists is not so much why states pursue the 
symbols of power in the form of, among other things, military industrialization. 
Waltz, in fact, has a perfectly good answer to that question: The close juxtaposition 
of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a failure 
to conform to successful practices. . . . The socialization of nonconformist states 
proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement in the system'.22 That 
is, states, at minimum, want to survive, and a process of social Darwinism tells them 
that possession of symbols of power will help them to do that. Rather, the more 
fundamental question neglected by realism is: beyond the utility of symbols for state 
behaviour, what do they say about the meaning of statehood itself? 
Constructivists, borrowing from the 'institutional' approach in sociology, suggest 
that 
'security environments in which states are embedded are in important part 
cultural and institutional'. These environments 'affect not only the incentives for 
different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states'?that is, state 
identity.23 This latter claim sets constructivism apart not only from realism, but also 
liberalism which, while directing our attention to norms and institutions in 
international relations, has little to say about the construction of state identity. More 
important than taking a stand on the neoliberal-neorealist debate about the impact 
of institutions on state behaviour is the constructivist claim that social life, including 
international life, is 'ideas all the way down'.24 That is, whether power matters or 
whether institutions matter, the effects of both operate through their impact on the 
understandings, expectations, and knowledge shared by states. States not only 
behave (exert power, join institutions) in accordance with cues received from the 
structure of shared knowledge (or 'global culture') of which they are part, they are 
also defined or constituted by that structure.25 Demonstrating the social construc 
tion of state identity, as opposed simply to state behaviour, represents a major 
challenge for empirically inclined scholars working within this tradition. It requires 
21 See Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', 
International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335-70. 22 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 128, 
74-77. Actually, Waltz is referring to the process by which states learn balancing behaviour, as 
opposed to bandwagoning, but socialization is said to explain the learning of other forms of 
behaviour highlighted by realists. For a discussion of the impact on military doctrine, see Barry 
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 23 
Jepperson et al., 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', p. 33. See also Martha 
Finnemore, 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism', 
International Organization, 50 (1996), pp. 325^7, who details constructivism's roots in institutionalist 
sociology. 24 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), ch. 3. Constructivists, at least some, suggest that their approach should ultimately subsume 
both realism and liberalism in delineating the conditions under which state behaviour highlighted by 
these latter theories operate. See Jepperson et al., 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 
pp. 68-72. 
25 
Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory'; Anthony Giddens, The 
Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984). 
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nuclear, there is nothing in realist theory that is inconsistent with such a charac-
terization of Indian defence industrial policy. But a more serious lapse, something
for which realism has been rightly criticized, is the failure to fully examine the source
of those motivations (in a sense, preferences) and, more especially, the dynamic
relationship between states as actors and the environment within which states
interact.21 The question neglected by realists is not so much why states pursue the
symbols of power in the form of, among other things, military industrialization.
Waltz, in fact, has a perfectly good answer to that question: 'The close juxtaposition
of states promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a failure
to conform to successful practices. The socialization of nonconformist states
proceeds at a pace that is set by the extent of their involvement in the system'.22 That
is, states, at minimum, want to survive, and a process of social Darwinism tells them
that possession of symbols of power will help them to do that. Rather, the more
fundamental question neglected by realism is: beyond the utility of symbols for state
behaviour, what do they say about the meaning of statehood itself?
Constructivists, borrowing from the 'institutional' approach in sociology, suggest
that 'security environments in which states are embedded are in important part
cultural and institutional'. These environments 'affect not only the incentives for
different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states'-that is, state
identity.23 This latter claim sets constructivism apart not only from realism, but also
liberalism which, while directing our attention to norms and institutions in
international relations, has little to say about the construction of state identity. More
important than taking a stand on the neoliberal-neorealist debate about the impact
of institutions on state behaviour is the constructivist claim that social life, including
international life, is 'ideas all the way down'.24 That is, whether power matters or
whether institutions matter, the effects of both operate through their impact on the
understandings, expectations, and knowledge shared by states. States not only
behave (exert power, join institutions) in accordance with cues received from the
structure of shared knowledge (or 'global culture') of which they are part, they are
also defined or constituted by that structure.25 Demonstrating the social construc-
tion of state identity, as opposed simply to state behaviour, represents a major
challenge for empirically inclined scholars working within this tradition. It requires
21 See Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory',
International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 335-70.
22 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 128,
74-77. Actually, Waltz is referring to the process by which states learn balancing behaviour, as
opposed to bandwagoning, but socialization is said to explain the learning of other forms of
behaviour highlighted by realists. For a discussion of the impact on military doctrine, s e Barry
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
23 Jepperson et aI., 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', p. 33. See also Martha
Finnemore, 'Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism',
International Organization, 50 (1996), pp. 325--47, who details constructivism's r ots in institutionalist
sociology.
24 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), ch. 3. Constructivists, at least some, suggest that their approach should ultimately subsume
both realism and liberalism in delineating the conditions under which state behaviour highlighted by
these latter theories operate. See Jepperson et aI., 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security',
pp.68-72.
25 Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory'; Anthony Giddens, The
Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).
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distinguishing between, on the one hand, states behaving in ways international 
society tells them to and, on the other hand, states just being.26 
The relevance of constructivist theory generally is the prominence given to 
symbolic motivations for state action?or the symbols of state identity. If state 
preferences are to be problematized and not taken as given, then constructivism 
seems more inclined than realism to entertain the possibility that symbolic 
motivations, and not just material interests, are significant forces behind military 
industrialization. Suchman and Eyre draw our attention to symbolic motivations in 
their examination of arms import patterns in the Third World. These patterns are 
puzzling because very high-end equipment acquisitions, common in the Third World, 
are not obviously the most appropriate from either a military or an economic 
viewpoint. Suchman and Eyre suggest we look to the 'metonymical iconography of 
the global cultural order', which teaches states to covet advanced weaponry not 
necessarily for its destructive efficiency, but for its 'symbolic throw weight'. State 
preferences are shaped by 'an essentially "ritualistic" . . . belief in militaries and 
modern weaponry as distinguishing emblems of the modern nation-state'.27 Military 
procurement and force structuring exhibit 'technologism', or the 'symbolic valuation 
of advanced over alternative technology', which may be less than optimal in the 
Third World context.28 The acquisition and, ultimately, the production of advanced 
weaponry becomes an important feature of state identity. According to Sagan, 
'military organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving 
functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of 
what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states'.29 
A similar claim has been advanced for some time by those who study the arms 
trade. Kaldor, for instance, maintains that 'the possession of weapons systems allows 
for an ordering of international military relations, conferring political influence, 
merely through perceptions about military power'. Participation in this weapons 
system thus provides 'a form of international legitimacy for Third World govern 
ments'.30 Symbols are also central in certain postmodern accounts. Luke, for 
example, following Jean Baudrillard, contends that 'the defence-industrial network 
produces strategic weapons objects as signs more than real engines of death' and 
further that 'a vital industrial capacity, strong R&D centers, growing technological 
26 On state identity (the 'character of statehood') and the degree to which we might be able to 
distinguish this empirically from state behaviour, which respects and reinforces existing norms of state 
sovereignty or practice, see Jepperson et al., 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security', 
pp. 35-6. 
27 
See, respectively, Suchman and Eyre, 'Military Procurement as Rational Myth', pp. 149-50, 154, and 
Eyre and Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons', p. 92. 28 Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, 'Dependent State Formation and Third World 
Militarization', Review of International Studies, 19 (1993), p. 339. Luckham refers to 'fetishism of the 
weapon', Albrecht and Kaldor to 'technology fetishism'. See Robin Luckham, 'Armament Culture', 
Alternatives, 10 (1984), pp. 1^44, and Ulrich Albrecht and Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction', in Mary 
Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide (eds.), The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology on the 
Third World (New York: Praeger, 1979). See also Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt, 'The 
Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization', in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: 
National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992) and Herbert Wulf, 
'Dependent Militarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative Concepts', in Stephanie G. Neuman 
and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.), Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979). 29 Scott D. Sagan, 'Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb', 
International Security, 21 (1996/7), p. 74. 30 
Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (New York, 1981), p. 144. 
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distinguishing between, on the one hand, states behaving in ways international
society tells them to and, on the other hand, states just being.26
The relevance of constructivist theory generally is the prominence given to
symbolic motivations for state action-or the symbols of state identity. If state
preferences are to be problematized and not taken as given, then constructivism
s ems more inclined than realism to entertain the possibility that symbolic
motivations, and not just material interests, are significant forces behind military
industrialization. Suchman and Eyre draw our attention to symbolic motivations in
their examination of arms import patterns in the Third World. These patterns are
puzzling because very high-end equipment acquisitions, co mon in the Third World,
are not obviously the most appropriate from either a military or an economic
viewpoint. Suchman and Eyre suggest we look to the 'metonymical iconography of
the global cultural order', which teaches states to covet advanced weaponry not
necessarily for its destructive efficiency, but for its 'symbolic throw weight'. State
preferences are shaped by 'an essentially "ritualistic" . belief in militaries and
modern weaponry as distinguishing emblems of the modern nation-state'.27 Military
procurement and force structuring exhibit 'technologism', or the 'symbolic valuation
of advanced over alternative technology', which may be less than optimal in the
Third World context.28 The acquisition and, ultimately, the production of advanced
weaponry becomes an important feature of state identity. According to Sagan,
'military organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving
functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of
what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states'.29
A similar claim has been advanced for some time by those who study the arms
trade. Kaldor, for instance, maintains that 'the possession of weapons systems allows
for an ordering of international military relations, conferring political influence,
merely through perceptions about military power'. Participation in this weapons
system thus provides 'a form of international legitimacy for Third World govern-
ments'.30 Symbols are also central in certain postmodern accounts. Luke, for
example, following Jean Baudrillard, contends that 'the defence-industrial network
produces strategic weapons objects as signs more than real engines of death' and
further that 'a vital industrial capacity, strong R&D centers, growing technological
26 On state identity (the 'character of statehood') and the degree to which we might be able to
distinguish this empirically from state behaviour, which respects and reinforces existing norms of state
sovereignty or practice, s e Jepperson et aI., 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security',
pp.35-6.
27 See, respectively, Suchman and Eyre, 'Military Procurement as Rational Myth', pp. 149-50, 154, and
Eyre and Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons', p. 92.
28 Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, 'Dependent State Formation and Third World
Militarization', Review of International Studies, 19 (1993), p. 339. Luckham refers to 'fetishism of the
weapon', Albrecht and Kaldor to 'technology fetishism'. See Robin Luckham, ' rmament Culture',
Alternatives, 10 (1984), pp. 1-44, and Ulrich Albrecht and Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction', in Mary
Kaldor and Asbj0rn Eide (eds.), The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology on the
Third World (New York: Praeger, 1979). See also Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt, 'The
Systemic Sources of Dependent Militarization', in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma:
National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992) and Herbert Wulf,
'Dependent Militarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative Concepts', in Stephanie G. Neuman
and Robert E. Harkavy (eds.), Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979).
29 Scott D. Sagan, 'Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb',
International Security, 21 (1996/7), p. 74.
30 Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (New York, 1981), p. 144.
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capabilities, increasing defence budgets, and constant improvements in the defence 
industrial network are a sign-set that must appear in the display of superpower sign 
exchange values'.31 Such observations apply to aspiring powers like India as well. 
Indeed, the advanced weaponry produced by Third World states?in effect, copies of 
the signs themselves?would seem to be a good example of Baudrillard's 'simulacra'. 
If military industrialization is a socially constructed symbol of modern statehood, 
then the agents of socialization can be found in the training of Third World military 
elites, first by their colonial authorities and then, during the Cold War, by both sides 
in the East-West competition. The process also operates through the international 
arms trade itself, since '[t]he joint possession of weapons systems and appropriate 
organisation creates agreement about what constitutes military power'.32 More 
generally, according to this perspective, states like India adopt preferences for 
advanced weapons?and, we would add, the capacity to manufacture them?by 
virtue of being embedded in a particular global culture or 'world military order', 
through which 'symbols and meanings prevalent in advanced capitalist societies are 
imposed on other societies'.33 Empirical researchers have sought to link the move 
ment toward isomorphism in military procurement patterns to the extent of immer 
sion in this global culture. Thus, Eyre and Suchman observe a correlation between 
the possession of symbolically significant weaponry, like supersonic aircraft, and the 
state's membership in international governmental organizations.34 
Rarely, perhaps never, have analysts adopting a sociological perspective taken the 
position that the forces driving Third World arms acquisitions or military industrial 
ization are solely symbolic to the exclusion of more material or functional concerns. 
(Here is the distinction between weaponry and other more thoroughly symbolic 
objects like national flags.) The empirical task for social constructivism is therefore 
rather difficult in this context. It requires not only demonstrating that symbolic 
concerns do in fact motivate state behaviour (and inhere in state identity), but also 
overcoming a realist bias in security analysis which favours explanations resting 
upon the material interests of states. 
At this stage, we are not prepared to weigh in with a position on which assort 
ment of material and symbolic motivations provide the best causal explanation for 
India's indigenous arms-production programme. We emphasize symbolic factors in 
this article not because we have concluded that these are most important, but 
because we believe they warrant more attention than they currently receive in the 
security literature, especially on the topic of conventional arms procurement. If 
symbolic and material motivations predicted fundamentally different forms of 
behaviour, the task of assessing the causal significance of symbolic motivations 
would not be so hard. If, for example, regional security and domestic economic 
31 
Timothy Luke, 'What's Wrong With Deterrence? A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security 
Policy', in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International)'Intertextual Relations: 
Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington, MA, 1989), pp. 224, 225. See also Jean 
Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983). 32 
Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p. 144. See also A.F. Mullins, Jr., 
Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1987), especially ch. 2, and Luckham, Armament Culture'. 33 
Luckham, Armament Culture', p. 32. The notion of a 'world military order' is broached by Albrecht 
and Kaldor in their introduction to World Military Order, and discussed at greater length in Kaldor, 
The Baroque Arsenal. 34 
Eyre and Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons'. 
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capabilities, increasing defence budgets, and constant improvements in the defence-
industrial network are a sign-set that must appear in the display of superpower sign-
exchange values'. 31 Such observations apply to aspiring powers like India as well.
Indeed, the advanced weaponry produced by Third World states-in effect, copies of
the signs themselves-would seem to be a good example of Baudrillard's 'simulacra'.
If military industrialization is a socially constructed symbol of modern statehood,
then the agents of socialization can be found in the training of Third World military
elites, first by their colonial authorities and then, during the Cold War, by both sides
in the East-West competition. The process also operates through the international
arms trade itself, since '[t]he joint possession of weapons systems and appropriate
organisation creates agreement about what constitutes military power'. 32 More
generally, according to this perspective, states like India adopt preferences for
advanced weapons-and, we would add, the capacity to manufacture them-by
virtue of being embedded in a particular global culture or ' orld military order',
through which 'symbols and meanings prevalent in advanced capitalist societies are
imposed on other societies'. 33 Empirical researchers have sought to link the move-
ment toward isomorphism in military procurement patterns to the extent of i mer-
sion in this global culture. Thus, Eyre and Suchman observe a correlation between
the possession of symbolically significant weaponry, like supersonic aircraft, and the
state's membership in international governmental organizations.34
Rarely, perhaps never, have analysts adopting a sociological perspective taken the
position that the forces driving Third World arms acquisitions or military industrial-
ization are solely symbolic to the exclusion of more material or functional concerns.
(Here is the distinction between weaponry and other more thoroughly symbolic
objects like national flags.) The empirical task for social constructivism is therefore
rather difficult in this context. It requires not only demonstrating that symbolic
concerns do in fact motivate state behaviour (and inhere in state identity), but also
overcoming a realist bias in security analysis which favours explanations resting
upon the material interests of states.
At this stage, we are not prepared to weigh in with a position on which assort-
ment of material and symbolic motivations provide the best causal explanation for
India's indigenous arms-production programme. We emphasize symbolic factors in
this article not because we have concluded that these are most important, but
because we believe they warrant more attention than they currently receive in the
security literature, especially on the topic of conventional arms procurement. If
symbolic and material motivations predicted fundamentally different forms of
behaviour, the task of assessing the causal significance of symbolic motivations
would not be so hard. If, for example, regional security and domestic economic
31 Timothy Luke, ' hat's Wrong With Deterrence? A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security
Policy', in James Der Derian and Michael 1. Shapiro (eds.), International!Intertextual Relations:
Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington, MA, 1989), pp. 224, 225. See also Jean
Baudrillard, Simulations (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983).
32 Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p. 144. See also A.F. Mullins, Jr.,
Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1987), especially ch. 2, and Luckham, 'Ar ament Culture'.
33 Luckham, 'Ar ament Culture', p. 32. The notion of a ' orld military order' is broached by Albrecht
and Kaldor in their introduction to World Military Order, and discussed at greater length in Kaldor,
The Baroque Arsenal.
34 Eyre and Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons'.
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considerations incline Indian leaders to purchase weaponry from abroad, while 
symbolic motivations propel them to make their own, the relative importance of 
these various factors might be readily apparent through an examination of Indian 
weapons procurement patterns. Indeed, some Indian critics of indigenization point 
to both the excessive costs and the lacklustre performance of some of India's 
weapons systems as evidence that military security and economics call for continued 
foreign purchases, arguing that national pride and international prestige alone 
provide the (misguided) rationale for domestic arms production. Nevertheless, it is 
clear from public discussion and debate that many Indians have found compelling 
reasons for indigenization in the country's economic and security environment, so 
that symbolic motivations would appear to exist alongside these as the driving forces 
behind military industrialization. These are predominantly complementary, not 
countervailing, forces. 
There is a another problem associated with trying to assess the causal import of 
symbolic and non-symbolic motivations for Indian arms production. In contrasting 
symbolic considerations with 'material', 'functional', or 'rational' ones, we do not 
mean to imply that international recognition or national pride are in fact inconse 
quential to Indian national security. Enhanced prestige has a real impact on the way 
the international community interacts with a state on security-related matters, which 
is why India and many other states covet it. A unified and confident self-image as a 
nation?the domestic side of international status and prestige?has consequences as 
well, especially in a democracy, because leaders are encouraged to be decisive in their 
international dealings. Thus, ascertaining whether real security implications follow 
from India's military-industrial efforts cannot serve as a basis upon which to judge 
the relative importance of symbolic and non-symbolic factors. 
Weapons production and public discourse in India 
Since symbolism can motivate the same behaviour as does 'rational' military calcul 
ation or industrial policy, we must look beyond that behaviour in order to judge 
competing explanations for what drives it. We cannot begin to do so until symbolic 
rationales for indigenous arms production are more adequately documented. For 
this reason our analysis is more descriptive than causal. Our findings, while they may 
lend themselves to explanations of military procurement that emphasize the role of 
symbolism, could figure in alternative theoretical accounts. In short, we are 
describing what we feel is a neglected variable in security analysis, but we are 
deferring to subsequent research a firm conclusion regarding the causal significance 
of symbols relative to other motivating forces. However, we will be able to comment 
on the relative prominence of symbolic imagery compared to other seemingly more 
functional rationales for military industrialization as reflected in India's public 
discourse. 
Researchers have not devoted much attention to documenting evidence for the 
symbolic motivations driving state behaviour, especially patterns of weapons acquis 
ition. Realists might be expected to forego the empirical analysis of symbols since 
they are assumed to play a minor role in the utility functions of states. Also, as we 
have pointed out and as we shall emphasize again later, much of the symbolic 
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considerations incline Indian leaders to purchase weaponry from abroad, while
symbolic motivations propel them to make their own, the relative importance of
these various factors might be readily apparent through an examination of Indian
weapons procurement patterns. Indeed, some Indian critics of indigenization point
to both the excessive costs and the lacklustre performance of some of India's
weapons systems as evidence that military security and economics call for continued
foreign purchases, arguing that national pride and international prestige alone
provide the (misguided) rationale for domestic arms production. Nevertheless, it is
clear from public discussion and debate that many Indians have found compelling
reasons for indigenization in the country's economic and security environment, so
that symbolic motivations would appear to exist alongside these as the driving forces
behind military industrialization. These are predominantly complementary, not
countervailing, forces.
There is a another problem associated with trying to assess the causal import of
symbolic and non-symbolic motivations for Indian arms production. In contrasting
symbolic considerations with 'material', 'functional', or 'rational' ones, we do not
mean to imply that international recognition or national pride are in fact inconse-
quential to Indian national security. Enhanced prestige has a real impact on the way
the international community interacts with a state on security-related matters, which
is why India and many other states covet it. A unified and confident self-image as a
nation-the domestic side of international status and prestige-has consequences as
well, especially in a democracy, because leaders are encouraged to be decisive in their
international dealings. Thus, ascertaining whether real security implications follow
from India's military-industrial efforts cannot serve as a basis upon which to judge
the relative importance of symbolic and non-symbolic factors.
Weapons production and public discourse in India
Since symbolism can motivate the same behaviour as does 'rational' military calcul-
ation or industrial policy, we must look beyond that behaviour in order to judge
competing explanations for what drives it. We cannot begin to do so until symbolic
rationales for indigenous arms production are more adequately documented. For
this reason our analysis is more descriptive than causal. Our findings, while they may
lend themselves to explanations of military procurement that emphasize the role of
symbolism, could figure in alternative theoretical accounts. In short, we are
describing what we feel is a neglected variable in security analysis, but we are
deferring to subsequent research a firm conclusion regarding the causal significance
of symbols relative to other motivating forces. However, we will be able to co ment
on the relative prominence of symbolic imagery compared to other seemingly more
functional rationales for military industrialization as reflected in India's public
discourse.
Researchers have not devoted much attention to documenting evidence for the
symbolic motivations driving state behaviour, especially patterns of weapons acquis-
ition. Realists might be expected to forego the empirical analysis of symbols since
they are assumed to playa minor role in the utility functions of states. Also, as we
have pointed out and as we shall emphasize again later, much of the symbolic
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imagery present in Indian discourse relates to the nation's image of itself. This 
preoccupation may have much to do with domestic culture and political history, and 
such internal characteristics of states receive scant attention in realist analysis, 
especially in structural realism. A full account of the role of symbols in motivating 
arms procurement or other forms of state behaviour invites a line of inquiry typically 
rejected as unproductive by realists.35 
Social constructivists, while in principle receptive to the documentation of 
symbolic motivations, have anticipated a bias in the empirical evidence. Suchman 
and Eyre worry that 'locating empirical evidence of nonrational decision making 
poses a significant methodological problem, particularly for investigators employing 
case-study techniques'. Since there is a 'rational myth' associated with military 
strategy and planning itself, an analysis of public justifications for weapons 
purchases and, by extension, indigenous weapons production 'is far more likely to 
find evidence of strategic, factional, or geopolitical logic than it is to uncover 
affirmations of ritual conformity'.36 While we acknowledge this potential bias, we 
are not quite so pessimistic about observing symbolic, 'nonrational' motivations in 
the public discourse on weapons production. What we see may only be the tip of the 
iceberg, but what is observable provides a wealth of insight?enough, we believe, to 
justify continued exploration both above and below the surface. 
We examine India Today, a weekly news magazine, in an effort to document the 
symbolic motivations behind the country's indigenous weapons programmes. We 
choose India Today because it is India's most popular weekly and thus provides a 
large window through which we can examine the public discourse on military 
industrialization. It is read by a large cross-section of Indian society and can be 
expected to capture the imagery of India's burgeoning middle classes. Its political 
outlook is very much mainstream, though its contributors are by no means neutral 
on the contentious issues that become subjects of public debate. India Today is 
sometimes critical, sometimes supportive of official Indian policy, but rarely extreme 
in its news reporting or opinions. As a tool for profiling the whole range of 
motivations for Indian arms production, there is probably no better single source of 
information. India Today is also a credible source. It is read and cited by South 
Asian specialists as a source of factual information and for insights into Indian 
public opinion and debate. 
Some information encountered in India Today conveys official positions and 
policies of the Indian government simply because these are often the subject of news 
reporting or analysis. Statements pertaining to Indian arms production may be 
attributed to government officials, military leaders, or leading figures in the defence 
industry. Others represent statements of fact or opinion made by India Today 
reporters, and these presumably reflect in many instances the views of the magazine's 
editors. In any event, we are not terribly concerned with examining the official 
35 Some researchers have explored the domestic political and cultural bases of realpolitik behaviour by 
states. See, for example, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Alastair Iain Johnson, Cultural Realism: Strategic 
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
Locating the determinants of realpolitik (or at least some of them) within the state has been viewed 
by some as expanding the repertoire of realism, but such a focus is not consistent with typical realist 
analysis. 36 Suchman and Eyre, 'Military Procurement as Rational Myth', p. 151. 
This content downloaded  on Fri, 25 Jan 2013 10:57:36 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Military industrialization and public discourse in India 363
imagery present in Indian discourse relates to the nation's image of itself. This
preoccupation may have much to do with domestic culture and political history, and
such internal characteristics of states receive scant attention in realist analysis,
especially in structural realism. A full account of the role of symbols in motivating
arms procurement or other forms of state behaviour invites a line of inquiry typically
rejected as unproductive by realists. 35
Social constructivists, while in principle receptive to the documentation of
symbolic motivations, have anticipated a bias in the empirical evidence. Suchman
and Eyre worry that 'locating empirical evidence of nonrational decision making
poses a significant methodological problem, particularly for investigators employing
case-study techniques'. Since there is a 'rational myth' associated with military
strategy and planning itself, an analysis of public justifications for weapons
purchases and, by extension, indigenous weapons production 'is far more likely to
find evidence of strategic, factional, or geopolitical logic than it is to uncover
affirmations of ritual conformity'. 36 While we acknowledge this potential bias, we
are not quite so pessimistic about observing symbolic, 'nonrational' motivations in
the public discourse on weapons production. What we s e may only be the tip of the
iceberg, but what is observable provides a wealth of insight-enough, we believe, to
justify continued exploration both above and below the surface.
We examine India Today, a weekly news magazine, in an effort to document the
symbolic motivations behind the country's indigenous weapons programmes. We
choose India Today because it is India's most popular weekly and thus provides a
large window through which we can examine the public discourse on military
industrialization. It is read by a large cross-section of Indian society and can be
expected to capture the imagery of India's burgeoning middle classes. Its political
outlook is very much mainstream, though its contributors are by no means neutral
on the contentious issues that become subjects of public debate. India Today is
sometimes critical, sometimes supportive of official Indian policy, but rarely extreme
in its news reporting or opinions. As a tool for profiling the whole range of
motivations for Indian arms production, there is probably no better single source of
information. India Today is also a credible source. It is read and cited by South
Asian specialists as a source of factual information and for insights into Indian
public opinion and debate.
Some information encountered in India Today conveys official positions and
policies of the Indian government simply because these are often the subject of news
reporting or analysis. Statements pertaining to Indian arms production may be
attributed to government officials, military leaders, or leading figures in the defence
industry. Others represent statements of fact or opinion made by India Today
reporters, and these presumably reflect in many instances the views of the magazine's
editors. In any event, we are not terribly concerned with examining the official
35 Some researchers have explored the domestic political and cultural bases of realpolitik behaviour by
states. See, for example, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Alastair lain Johnson, Cultural Realism: Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Locating the determinants of realpolitik (or at least some of them) within the state has been viewed
by some as expanding the repertoire of realism, but such a focus is not consistent with typical realist
analysis.
36 Suchman and Eyre, 'Military Procurement as Rational Myth:, p. 151.
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pronouncements justifying Indian military industrialization. Indeed, we concur with 
Suchman and Eyre that official discourse is most likely to be biased by a rationalist 
myth.37 What we want to examine is the public discourse. Public discourse, it seems 
to us, subsumes (non-secret) official discourse, and therefore paints a more complete 
and a less biased picture of the social forces motivating the development of arms 
production capacity. 
We reviewed all issues of India Today from May 1977 to April 1999 and identified 
136 articles devoted in whole or in part to the issue of indigenous weapons 
production that also contained one or more statements regarding the motivations for 
India's domestic arms production programmes. Our focus was conventional arms 
production, although India's nuclear and space programmes are often discussed in 
the same articles and are identified as being motivated by the same set of 
considerations. We have also reviewed online issues of three other Indian sources?a 
fortnightly news magazine, Frontline, and two dailies, The Hindustan Times and The 
Hindu?in an attempt to expose any obvious biases or omissions in India Today 
reporting. We found none. The online availability of these sources is limited to the 
more recent period, with no issues available before January 1996, but a similar 
profile emerges from each of them. The same types of rationales for weapons 
indigenization revealed by India Today can be found in these other publications, and 
each type occupies roughly the same level of prominence as in India Today. We 
summarize these results in the Appendix. 
Although we were able to document several types of motivations for Indian arms 
production, our aim is to present a variety of statements representing symbolic 
motivations. We can, however, give some indication of the relative frequency with 
which the various types of motivations, material and symbolic, appear in the public 
discourse. Of the 136 articles containing justifications for indigenous weapons 
programmes, 91 mention India's enduring conflicts with Pakistan and/or China. These 
immediate security concerns are the most commonly expressed of all the motivations 
for domestic arms production, both in terms of the number of articles in which they 
appear and the frequency with which they are mentioned in these articles. Many of the 
same articles, plus some others?64 all together?refer to more general security 
concerns without specific mention of Pakistan or China, while 21 refer to India's 
dependence on foreign suppliers for weapons or spare parts and the implications for 
the country's warfighting capacity. In addition to these security-related motivations, 
other material considerations are mainly economic. The potential benefits of weapons 
indigenization for the civilian sector, including overall technological development, are 
mentioned in 31 articles, while 45 refer to either the expense of foreign arms imports 
or, more recently, the earning potential of Indian arms exports. 
Symbolic motivations for military industrialization are frequently mentioned in 
India Today. Exactly half of the 136 articles we examined included such references, 
which we divide into three categories: India's autonomy in foreign affairs (35 
articles), India's international status and prestige (39 articles), and India's self-image 
(34 articles). In the following sections we describe this symbolic imagery in some 
what more detail with the help of excerpts from India Today. 
37 For an analysis of the construction of the 'official' discourse of security policy and strategies for 
legitimating it through popular media, in this case films and video, see Michael J. Shapiro, 'Strategic 
Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of "Security Policy" in the Video Age', 
International Studies Quarterly, 34 (1990), pp. 327-40. 
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pronouncements justifying Indian military industrialization. Indeed, we concur with
Suchman and Eyre that official discourse is most likely to be biased by a rationalist
myth.37 What we want to examine is the public discourse. Public discourse, it seems
to us, subsumes (non-secret) official discourse, and therefore paints a more complete
and a less biased picture of the social forces motivating the development of arms
production capacity.
We reviewed all issues of India Today from May 1977 to April 1999 and identified
136 articles devoted in whole or in part to the issue of indigenous weapons
production that also contained one or more statements regarding the motivations for
India's domestic arms production programmes. Our focus was conventional arms
production, although India's nuclear and space programmes are often discussed in
the same articles and are identified as being motivated by the same set of
considerations. We have also reviewed online issues of three other Indian sources-a
fortnightly news magazine, Frontline, and t o dailies, The Hindustan Times and The
Hindu-in an attempt to expose any obvious biases or omissions in India Today
reporting. We found none. The online availability of these sources is limited to the
more recent period, with no issues available before January 1996, but a similar
profile emerges from each of them. The same types of rationales for weapons
indigenization revealed by India Today can be found in these other publications, and
each type occupies roughly the same level of prominence as in India Today. We
su marize these results in the Appendix.
Although we w re able to document several types of motivations for Indian arms
production, our aim is to present a variety of statements representing symbolic
motivations. We can, however, give some indication of the relative frequency with
which the various types of motivations, material and symbolic, appear in the public
discourse. Of the 136 articles containing justifications for indigenous weapons
programmes, 91 mention India's enduring conflicts with Pakistan and/or China. These
i mediate security concerns are the most commonly expressed of all the motivations
for domestic arms production, both in terms of the number of articles in which they
appear and the frequency with which they are mentioned in these articles. Many of the
same articles, plus some others-64 all together-refer to more general security
concerns without specific mention of Pakistan or China, while 21 refer to India's
dependence on foreign suppliers for weapons or spare parts and the implications for
the country's warfighting capacity. In addition to these security-related motivations,
other material considerations are mainly economic. The potential benefits of weapons
indigenization for the civilian sector, including overall technological development, are
mentioned in 31 articles, while 45 refer to either the expense of foreign arms imports
or, more recently, the earning potential of Indian arms exports.
Symbolic motivations for military industrialization are frequently mentioned in
India Today. Exactly half of the 136 articles we examined included such references,
which we divide into three categories: India's autonomy in foreign affairs (35
articles), India's international status and prestige (39 articles), and India's self-image
(34 articles). In the following sections we describe this symbolic imagery in some-
what more detail with the help of excerpts from India Today.
37 For an analysis of the construction of the 'official' discourse of security policy and strategies for
legitimating it through popular media, in this case films and video, s e Michael 1. Shapiro, 'Strategic
Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of "Security Policy" in the Video Age',
International Studies Quarterly, 34 (1990), pp. 327-40.
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Exhibit A: on Indian autonomy 
As we have suggested, rather than flatly categorizing military hardware or defence 
industrial policy as either of symbolic or functional import, it is probably better to 
appreciate that some mix of the two often motivates procurement. This mix is 
apparent in statements that link Indian accomplishments in weapons development to 
an increase in Indian autonomy (all italics are ours). 
[1] This approach of 'capability matching' rather than building strength to suit the nation's 
long-term threat wastes money and gives India's defence doctrine an undesirable 
defensive hue. Besides such armament decisions also make the country increasingly 
dependent on foreign sources. Says [defence analyst] Jaswant Singh: 'You always pay a 
political price for arms imports. Weapon supply is after all a lubricant of diplomacy 
today'?* 
[2] Though the speech played down Agni's strategic importance, Rajiv personally added a 
line: 'We must remember that technological backwardness also leads to subjugation'?9 
There is an explicit recognition on the part of Indian elites that the failure to pro 
duce advanced weaponry threatens to limit India's manoeuvrability in the exercise of 
foreign policy, but only in the vaguest terms. Rajiv Gandhi's reference to 'sub 
jugation' is intended to highlight the dangers of becoming dependent on the 
superpowers in particular (excerpt [2]), as are other statements reported in India 
Today: 
[3] ... The MiG-29 purchase also symbolises the return to an era of dependency, since it is 
just one item in an overflowing basket of weaponry that India has been buying from 
Moscow in the last two years, ranging from tanks to high reconnaissance spy planes to 
missiles and helicopters. . . . What is causing even greater concern is the fact that 
dependence on the Soviets is now creeping into new areas that undermine India's laborious 
attempts to become self-reliant in defence production.40 
[4] India, it would seem, has no alternative but to maintain a modern, mobile and efficient 
military machine. How this can be done in a realistic manner, without squandering 
national foreign exchange reserves and becoming dependent on either or both of the 
superpowers is a question that will increasingly bother India's defence planners in the 
years to come.41 
Aside from India's more material interest in not squandering foreign exchange 
reserves, here again the concern seems to be with dependence per se, and not the 
implications for India's overall military capacity, which is presumably enhanced by 
the acquisition of Russian weaponry. Clearly, short-term military capacity is not all 
that matters to Indian defence planners given their 'laborious attempts' to indigenize 
defence production (excerpt [3]). 
Indigenization has indeed taken on symbolic significance in India, to the point of 
becoming an emblem of Indian nationalism: 
[5] Indian military aircraft designers have sat virtually idle for nearly 20 years since HAL's 
HF-24 project folded up. 'The aeronautical community has been treated brutally for 25 
38 Shekar Gupta, 'The New Thrust', India Today, 15 November 1985. 39 
Dilip Bobb, 'Chariot of Fire', India Today, 15 June 1989. 40 
Dilip Bobb, 'Moscow's New Offensive', India Today, 31 August 1984. 41 Shekar Gupta, 'The New Thrust', India Today, 15 November 1985. 
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Exhibit A: on Indian autonomy
As we have suggested, rather than flatly categorizing military hardware or defence
industrial policy as either of symbolic or functional import, it is probably better to
appreciate that some mix of the t o often motivates procurement. This mix is
apparent in statements that link Indian accomplishments in weapons development to
an increase in Indian autonomy (all italics are ours).
[1] This approach of 'capability matching' rather than building strength to suit the nation's
long-term threat wastes money and gives India's defence doctrine an undesirable
defensive hue. Besides such armament decisions also make the country increasingly
dependent on foreign sources. Says [defence analyst] Jaswant Singh: ' ou always pay a
political price for arms imports. Weapon supply is after all a lubricant of diplomacy
today'. 38
[2] Though the speech played down Agni's strategic importance, Rajiv personally added a
line: ' e must remember that technological backwardness also leads to subjugation'. 39
There is an explicit recognition on the part of Indian elites that the failure to pro-
duce advanced weaponry threatens to limit India's manoeuvrability in the exercise of
foreign policy, but only in the vaguest terms. Rajiv Gandhi's reference to 'sub-
jugation' is intended to highlight the dangers of becoming dependent on the
superpowers in particular (excerpt [2]), as are other statements reported in India
Today:
[3] .. The MiG-29 purchase also symbolises the return to an era of dependency, since it is
just one item in an overflowing basket of weaponry that India has been buying from
Moscow in the last two years, ranging from tanks to high reconnaissance spy planes to
missiles and helicopters. . What is causing even greater concern is the fact that
dependence on the Soviets is now creeping into new areas that undermine India's laborious
attempts to become self-reliant in defence production.4o
[4] India, it would seem, has no alternative but to maintain a modern, mobile and efficient
military machine. How this can be done in a realistic manner, without squandering
national foreign exchange reserves and becoming dependent on either or both of the
superpowers is a question that will increasingly bother India's defence planners in the
years to come.41
Aside from India's more material interest in not squandering foreign exchange
reserves, here again the concern s ems to be with dependence per se, and not the
implications for India's overall military capacity, which is presumably enhanced by
the acquisition of Russian weaponry. Clearly, short-term military capacity is not all
that matters to Indian defence planners given their 'laborious attempts' to indigenize
defence production (excerpt [3]).
Indigenization has indeed taken on symbolic significance in India, to the point of
becoming an emblem of Indian nationalism:
[5] Indian military aircraft designers have sat virtually idle for nearly 20 years since HAL's
HF-24 project folded up. ' he aeronautical community has been treated brutally for 25
38 Shekar Gupta, 'The New Thrust', India Today, 15 November 1985.
39 Dilip Bobb, ' hariot of Fire', India Today, 15 June 1989.
40 Dilip Bobb, ' oscow's New Offensive', India Today, 31 August 1984.
41 Shekar Gupta, 'The New Thrust', India Today, 15 November 1985.
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years. We have lost two generations of aeronautical engineers. That's why we are now on a 
swadeshi track', explains Arunachalam [scientific advisor to the defence minister]. And 
the LCA team leader Harinarayana aptly symbolises this swadeshi spirit. 'I am a totally 
indigenous product', he proclaims proudly 'I have never studied or worked abroad'.42 
[6] On Pakistan's nuclear potential: Political analyst Hari Jaisingh says: '. . . The BJP's stand 
is crystal clear. It wants a swadeshi bomb'.43 
[7] Each Arjun will cost Rs 7.5 crore to Rs 11 crore each, which ironically is close to the 
price of an imported tank. But then indigenisation is the raison d'etre of the MBT 
project.44 
The term 'swadeshi' was popularized by Mahatma Gandhi in the context of his 
campaign to encourage Indians to spin their own cloth instead of relying on British 
imports, and thus the term has a clear nationalist ring. It is not surprising therefore 
that the intensely nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party would call for a 'swadeshi 
bomb' (excerpt [6]). The notion is taken to a slightly comical extreme when the LCA 
team leader uses swadeshi to describe himself (excerpt [5]). The symbolism inherent 
in indigenization is amply demonstrated by the observation that, although the Arjun 
tank is no less expensive than an import, and possibly functionally inferior, to dwell 
on such material issues misses the point. Indigenization is an end in itself (excerpt 
[7]). 
The symbolic significance of military industrialization is also illustrated by a 
desire not merely to establish and protect Indian autonomy, but also to demonstrate 
Indian accomplishments to the rest of the world, or at least to those states that 
might be impressed: 
[8] General B.C. Joshi, chief of army staff: And because [Prithvi] is indigenously produced, 
it is far more important. Self-sufficiency is critical in this area. Now we are not beholden 
to any foreign power. . . . Agni has tremendous potential as it puts you in a totally 
different league. And as a technology demonstrator, the missile's success is of great 
significance to the country.'45 
[9] For years, the US had banned the sale of technology and material that could contribute 
to India's space and missile programme. While this helped delay its development, India 
demonstrated that it could successfully indigenise sophisticated technology.46 
[10] On the airborne surveillance platform: So, could the purpose of flying the patently 
incomplete ASP be to show that we can 'thump' the Pakistanis, given the fact that 
Pakistan can lease the US-made system from Saudi Arabia in a time of crisis? Or is it 
simply a message to [airborne early warning]-manufacturing nations, saying: 'If you don't 
sell it to us, we'll make it ourselves'.41 
These statements suggest that it is important both to develop advanced weapons 
technology and to make the international community aware that it has been 
developed. Of the various types of statements linking military industrialization to 
the promotion and protection of Indian autonomy, these are perhaps most indica 
tive of the importance of symbolism. Quite aside from whether India actually 
exercises its autonomy in foreign affairs, it is vitally important that the signs of 
42 Ramindar Singh, 'Trouble Before Take-off', India Today, 31 January 1986. 43 
Dilip Bobb and Ramindar Singh, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Bombshell', India Today, 31 March 1987. 44 Kanwar Sandhu, 'On Course, Finally', India Today, 15 July 1993. 45 
Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994. 46 
Raj Chengappa, 'Nuclear Blackmail', India Today, 30 April 1994. 47 Avirook Sen, 'Ground Realities', India Today, 31 December 1996. 
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years. We have lost t o generations of aeronautical engineers. That's why we are now on a
swadeshi track', explains Arunachalam [scientific advisor to the defence minister]. And
the LCA team leader Harinarayana aptly symbolises this swadeshi spirit. 'I am a totally
indigenous product', he proclaims proudly. 'I have never studied or worked abroad'.42
[6] On Pakistan's nuclear potential: Political analyst Hari Jaisingh says: '. . The BJP's stand
is crystal clear. It wants a swadeshi bomb'.43
[7] Each Arjun will cost Rs 7.5 crore to Rs 11 crore each, which ironically is close to the
price of an imported tank. But then indigenisation is the raison d'etre of the M BT
project.44
The term 's adeshi' was popularized by Mahatma Gandhi in the context of his
campaign to encourage Indians to spin their own cloth instead of relying on British
imports, and thus the term has a clear nationalist ring. It is not surprising therefore
that the intensely nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party would call for a 's adeshi
bomb' (excerpt [6]). The notion is taken to a slightly comical extreme when the LeA
team leader uses swadeshi to describe himself (excerpt [5]). The symbolism inherent
in indigenization is amply demonstrated by the observation that, although the Arjun
tank is no less expensive than an import, and possibly functionally inferior, to dwell
on such material issues misses the point. Indigenization is an end in itself (excerpt
[7]).
The symbolic significance of military industrialization is also illustrated by a
desire not merely to establish and protect Indian autonomy, but also to demonstrate
Indian accomplishments to the rest of the world, or at least to those states that
might be impressed:
[8] General B.C. Joshi, chief of army staff: ~nd because [Prithvi] is indigenously produced,
it is far more important. Self-sufficiency is critical in this area. Now we are not beholden
to any foreign power. Agni has tremendous potential as it puts you in a totally
different league. And as a technology demonstrator, the missile's success is of great
significance to the country.'45
[9] For years, the US had banned the sale of technology and material that could contribute
to India's space and missile programme. While this helped delay its development, India
demonstrated that it could successfully indigenise sophisticated technology.46
[10] On the airborne surveillance platform: So, could the purpose of flying the patently
incomplete ASP be to show that we can 'thump' the Pakistanis, given the fact that
Pakistan can lease the US-made system from Saudi Arabia in a time of crisis? Or is it
simply a message to [airborne early warning]-manufacturing nations, saying: 'If you don't
sell it to us, we'll make it ourselves' .47
These statements suggest that it is important both to develop advanced weapons
technology and to make the international community aware that it has been
developed. Of the various types of statements linking military industrialization to
the promotion and protection of Indian autonomy, these are perhaps most indica-
tive of the importance of symbolism. Quite aside from whether India actually
exercises its autonomy in foreign affairs, it is vitally important that the signs of
42 Ramindar Singh, 'Trouble Before Take-off', India Today, 31 January 1986.
43 Dilip Bobb and Ramindar Singh, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Bombshell', India Today, 31 March 1987.
44 Kanwar Sandhu, ' n Course, Finally', India Today, 15 July 1993.
45 Raj Chengappa, ' he Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994.
46 Raj Chengappa, ' uclear Blackmail', India Today, 30 April 1994.
47 Avirook Sen, ' round Realities', India Today, 31 December 1996.
Military industrialization and public discourse in India 367 
Indian autonomy be 'demonstrated' to the rest of the world (excerpts [8] and [9]). 
Indigenous weaponry, even when incomplete, sends 'a message' to other arms pro 
ducing states content to withhold their advanced technology from the international 
arms market (excerpt [10]). 
Exhibit B: on India's international status and prestige 
The purposes behind India's quest for autonomy in military production are both 
functional and symbolic, and we have tried to identify statements that reflect on the 
latter dimension. The reference above to Agni's potential for placing India in a 
'totally different league' (excerpt [8]) is echoed in other statements, which reflect 
more explicitly India's international aspirations: 
[11] The success of the SLV-3-(E)-02, a completely indigenous four-stage rocket... put India 
into an exclusive club with only five other members.... 'This is a great day for India and 
Indian science', proclaimed Mrs Gandhi, echoing the popular view. . . ,48 
[12] Whether in the corridors of the Defence R&D department in Delhi, or in the 
Bangalore offices of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the apex body 
which overseas the design and development of the LCA, there is an infectious 
enthusiasm that the LCA prototype will fly by 1989 and that it will catapult India into 
the technological superleague of nations who produce their own frontline fighter 
planes.49 
[13] At exactly 7:17 am on May 22, Agni blossomed into a chariot of fire that propelled 
India into an exclusive club dominated by the world's technological and military giants.50 
[14] On the unsuccessful test of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle: . . . PSLV's success would 
have made India a major player in the commercial space arena. As Professor Rao 
[chairman of the Space Research Organisation] says: 'It is a quantum leap in space 
technology for us and it would have given us the muscle power to put anything into 
space'. What was left unstated was that if PSLV succeeded, India could have also 
muscled into the exclusive club of countries having Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 
(ICBM) capability.51 
[15] Recently, a series of developments have powered the nation into the rarefied strata of 
strategic missile competence. Topping the list is the successful third launch of Agni, 
India's Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), on February 19.52 
All of these excerpts contain references to an elite group of nations that possess the 
capacity to produce one or another category of military hardware?the 'superleague 
of nations' producing fighters (excerpt [12]), the 'exclusive club' or 'rarefied strata' 
producing longer-range missiles (excerpts [11], [13-15])?as well as India's acquis 
ition or impending acquisition of elite status. The fact that indigenously produced 
weapons, such as the LCA, may be more expensive and possess mediocre per 
formance characteristics appears, in many ways, to be of secondary importance. The 
utility of indigenous military hardware seems to be, at least partly, 'symbolic': they 
48 Suman Dubey, 'Soaring Into the Space Age', India Today, 15 August 1980. 49 Ramindar Singh, 'Trouble Before take-off', India Today, 31 January 1986. 50 
Dilip Bobb, 'Chariot of Fire', India Today, 15 June 1989. 51 
Raj Changappa, 'PSLV's Deviant Behaviour', India Today, 15 October 1993. 52 
Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994. 
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Indian autonomy be 'demonstrated' to the rest of the world (excerpts [8] and [9]).
Indigenous weaponry, even when incomplete, sends 'a message' to other arms pro-
ducing states content to withhold their advanced technology from the international
arms market (excerpt [10]).
Exhibit B: on India's international status and prestige
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functional and symbolic, and we have tried to identify statements that reflect on the
latter dimension. The reference above to Agni's potential for placing India in a
'totally different league' (excerpt [8]) is echoed in other statements, which reflect
more explicitly India's international aspirations:
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into an exclusive club with only five other embers.... 'This is a great day for India and
Indian science', proclaimed Mrs Gandhi, echoing the popular view. . .48
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Bangalore offices of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the apex body
which overseas the design and development of the LCA, there is an infectious
enthusiasm that the LCA prototype will fly by 1989 and that it will catapult India into
the technological superleague of nations who produce their own frontline fighter
planes.49
[13] At exactly 7: 17 am on May 22, Agni blossomed into a chariot of fire that propelled
India into an exclusive club dominated by the world's technological and military giants. 50
[14] On the unsuccessful test of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle: PSLV's success would
have made India a major player in the co mercial space arena. As Professor Rao
[chairman of the Space Research Organisation] says: 'It is a quantum leap in space
technology for us and it would have given us the muscle power to put anything into
space'. What was left unstated was that if PSLV succeeded, India could have also
muscled into the exclusive club of countries having Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) capability.51
[15] Recently, a series of developments have powered the nation into the rarefied strata of
strategic missile competence. Topping the list is the successful third launch of Agni,
India's Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), on February 19.52
All of these excerpts contain references to an elite group of nations that possess the
capacity to produce one or another category of military hardware-the 'superleague
of nations' producing fighters (excerpt [12]), the 'exclusive club' or 'rarefied strata'
producing longer-range missiles (excerpts [11], [13-15])-as well as India's acquis-
ition or impending acquisition of elite status. The fact that indigenously produced
weapons, such as the LeA, may be more expensive and possess mediocre per-
formance characteristics appears, in many ways, to be of secondary importance. The
utility of indigenous military hardware seems to be, at least partly, 'symbolic': they
48 Suman Dubey, 'Soaring Into the Space Age', India Today, 15 August 1980.
49 Ramindar Singh, 'Trouble Before take-off', India Today, 31 January 1986.
50 Dilip Bobb, ' hariot of Fire', India Today, 15 June 1989.
51 Raj Changappa, 'PSLV's Deviant Behaviour', India Today, 15 October 1993.
52 Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994.
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are indicators of status and prestige. Other statements are quite explicit on this 
score: 
[16] Interview with Air Chief Marshal Denis A. La Fontaine: Tf we do not indigenise, how 
will we become a first class nation?'53 
[17] While the haggling goes on, the desperate need for the jet trainers is a grim reminder of 
the reality that the Indian policy makers seem to ignore in their heady rush for 'mini 
power status': that no nation has ever become a real power with its army firing mostly 
imported guns, its air force flying foreign aircraft and its navy riding submarines leased 
from another superpower.54 
[18] A.RJ. Abdul Kalam, head of the defence research programme: '... India can now be 
rated as a missile power that can deliver a range of missiles any time, anywhere that we 
want. Agni symbolises our technological capabilities. Prithvi is a world class surface-to 
surface missile. In the anti-tank class we want to be number one with Nag. Akash is 
heading for a unique second in its surface-to-air class.'55 
[19] Says Muchkund Dubey [former foreign secretary]: 'The bomb option is a currency of 
power that is critical to our survival as a strong nation'.56 
Here is the assertion that if India wants to become a 'first class nation', or even if 
India aspires to 'mini-power status', it cannot rely on imported weaponry because 
'real power' requires something more (excerpts [16] and [17]). Again, it is indigenous 
arms production, especially production of 'world class' missiles like Agni and 
Prithvi, that will 'symbolise' India's technological capabilities (excerpt [18]). The 
option to use nuclear weapons, now that India has developed its own missile 
capacity, can be used as a 'currency of power' (excerpt [19]). Such are the elements 
of international status and prestige identified in Indian discourse. 
Exhibit C: on Indias self-image 
We have noted that the writings and speeches of Indira Gandhi sometimes betray a 
certain concern about India's collective inferiority complex, especially the lack of 
pride among Indian scientists and engineers. They also express hope that military 
industrialization might play a role in enhancing Indian identity. Statements found 
in India Today suggest that Gandhi was not alone in either her concerns or her 
solutions: 
[20] On the launch of the SLV-3: 'With the team I have', said U.R. Rao who heads the 
Indian Space Research Organization's Satellite Centre (Isac) near Bangalore, 7 have 
enough confidence to build anything let alone satellites'.57 
[21] Says Dr A.RJ.A. Kalam, chief architect of Agni and the brain behind the success of the 
[Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme]: Agni gives us the confidence that 
we are capable of producing any kind of missile. We are now self-sufficient both in 
design and missile technology'.58 
53 Shekar Gupta, 'Design Gap', India Today, 15 November 1985. 54 Shekar Gupta, 'A Sea Change', India Today, 31 December 1987. 55 
Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994. 56 
Raj Chengappa, 'Nuclear Blackmail', India Today, 30 April 1994. 57 Suman Dubey, 'Soaring Into the Space Age', India Today, 15 August 1980. 58 
Dilip Bobb, 'Chariot of Fire', India Today, 15 June 1989. 
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are indicators of status and prestige. Other statements are quite explicit on this
score:
[16] Interview with Air Chief Marshal Denis A. La Fontaine: 'If we do not indigenise, how
will we become a first class nation?' 53
[1 7] While the haggling goes on, the desperate need for the jet trainers is a grim reminder of
the reality that the Indian policy makers s em to ignore in their heady rush for 'mini-
power status': that no nation has ever become a real power with its army firing mostly
imported guns, its air force flying foreign aircraft and its navy riding submarines leased
from another superpower.54
[18] A.P.I Abdul Kalam, head of the defence research programme: ' ... India can now be
rated as a missile power that can deliver a range of missiles any time, anywhere that we
want. Agni symbolises our technological capabilities. Prithvi is a world class surface-to-
surface missile. In the anti-tank class we want to be number one with Nag. Akash is
heading for a unique second in its surface-to-air class.' 55
[19] Says Muchkund Dubey [former foreign secretary]: 'The bomb option is a currency of
power that is critical to our survival as a strong nation'. 56
Here is the assertion that if India wants to become a 'first class nation', or even if
India aspires to 'mini-power status', it cannot rely on imported weaponry because
'real power' requires something more (excerpts [16] and [17]). Again, it is indigenous
arms production, especially production of ' orld class' missiles like Agni and
Prithvi, that will 'symbolise' India's technological capabilities (excerpt [18]). The
option to use nuclear weapons, now that India has developed its own missile
capacity, can be used as a 'currency of power' (excerpt [19]). Such are the elements
of international status and prestige identified in Indian discourse.
Exhibit C: on India's self-image
We have noted that the writings and speeches of Indira Gandhi sometimes betray a
certain concern about India's collective inferiority complex, especially the lack of
pride among Indian scientists and engineers. They also express hope that military
industrialization might play a role in enhancing Indian identity. Statements found
in India Today suggest that Gandhi was not alone in either her concerns or her
solutions:
[20] On the launch of the SLV-3: ' ith the team I have', said U.R. Rao who heads the
Indian Space Research Organization's Satellite Centre (Isac) near Bangalore, '[ have
enough confidence to build anything let alone satellites'. 57
[21] Says Dr A.~IA. Kalam, chief architect of Agni and the brain behind the su cess of the
[Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme]: 'Agni gives us the confidence that
we are capable of producing any kind of missile. We are now self-sufficient both in
design and missile technology'. 58
53 Shekar Gupta, 'Design Gap', India Today, 15 November 1985.
54 Shekar Gupta, 'A Sea Change', India Today, 31 December 1987.
55 Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994.
56 Raj Chengappa, 'Nuclear Blackmail', India Today, 30 April 1994.
57 Suman Dubey, 'Soaring Into the Space Age', India Today, 15 August 1980.
58 Dilip Bobb, 'Chariot of Fire', India Today, 15 June 1989.
Military industrialization and public discourse in India 369 
That individuals in such high positions in India's space technology community 
would speak of such successes in terms of enhanced 'confidence' reveals something 
about their prior lack of it. Demonstrations of Indian technological prowess not 
only contribute to the country's international status and prestige, they also provide a 
needed boost to India's image of itself. Other statements employ telling metaphors: 
[22] Says a top-level defence scientist: 'Prithvi could be a really major achievement. It signals 
our coming of age' ?9 
[23] On the LCA project: Ever since the HF 24's partial success, negated largely by the lack 
of a good engine, the IAF has depended on licensed production or off-the-shelf 
purchases. The Jaguar, the Mirage 2000 and the MiG 29 have given the IAF plenty of 
punch but it has not led to any major transfer of technologies. Now, as a defence expert 
says: 'We are toddlers in the business. We are groping for help'.60 
[24] A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, head of the defence research programme: 'Let us imagine a 
situation where we don't have strategic missiles and nations around us have either 
developed or purchased them. We would then be dependent on another country to help 
us out. Today our missile programme is playing a role in helping us stand on our legs?61 
Various stages of physical development are alluded to here?standing, toddling, 
coming of age?but all of them suggest a degree of immaturity relative to other 
nation-states that India aspires to emulate. Such references, along with those 
applauding increased self-confidence (excerpts [20] and [21]), do seem infused with 
more humility than statements asserting Indian autonomy or its international status 
and prestige. The symbolism is no less significant, however. India is like a child 
maturing into adulthood. The process of military industrialization may be slow, but 
it is perfectly natural, indeed inevitable, for a country like India who wants to grow 
up to be a major power someday. 
Conclusion 
In December 1995, India Today polled residents in nine major Indian cities on 
matters of nuclear policy. Sixty-two per cent approved of nuclear testing for purposes 
of developing India's nuclear weapons capability. Of these, 95 per cent felt that the 
nuclear option was important in order to protect India against nuclear threats from 
China and Pakistan, and 85 per cent felt that it was important to improve India's 
international bargaining power generally. These, of course, are straightforward 
functional concerns. But 83 per cent also gave another reason for India's nuclear 
capability: 'enhancing our international status'.62 Indians recognized the symbolic 
import of nuclear weapons, and distinguished this from more functional motivations. 
We reach a similar conclusion. Our systematic analysis of India Today, India's 
leading news magazine, suggests that India's material interests provide a central 
impetus for the policy of military industrialization. Most references to India's 
weapons production cite the country's enduring tensions with Pakistan and China. 
59 Shekar Gupta, 'Shooting Ahead', India Today, 31 March 1988. 60 
Raj Chengappa, 'A Testing Time', India Today, 31 August 1988. 61 
Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April 1994. 62 
'Opinion Poll: Yes to the Bomb', India Today, 31 December 1995. 
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That individuals in such high positions in India's space technology community
would speak of such successes in terms of enhanced 'confidence' reveals something
about their prior lack of it. Demonstrations of Indian technological prowess not
only contribute to the country's international status and prestige, they also provide a
needed boost to India's image of itself. Other statements employ telling metaphors:
[22] Says a top-level defence scientist: 'Prithvi could be a really major achievement. It signals
our coming of age'. 59
[23] On the LeA project: Ever since the HF 24's partial success, negated largely by the lack
of a good engine, the IAF has depended on licensed production or off-the-shelf
purchases. The Jaguar, the Mirage 2000 and the MiG 29 have given the IAF plenty of
punch but it has not led to any major transfer of technologies. Now, as a defence expert
says: ' e are toddlers in the business. We are groping for help' .60
[24] A. P. 1. Abdul Kalam, head of the defence research programme: ' et us imagine a
situation where we don't have strategic missiles and nations around us have either
developed or purchased them. We would then be dependent on another country to help
us out. Today our missile programme is playing a role in helping us stand on our legs.' 61
Various stages of physical development are alluded to here-standing, toddling,
coming of age-but all of them suggest a degree of immaturity relative to other
nation-states that India aspires to emulate. Such references, along with those
applauding increased self-confidence (excerpts [20] and [21]), do seem infused with
more humility than statements asserting Indian autonomy or its international status
and prestige. The symbolism is no less significant, however. India is like a child
maturing into adulthood. The process of military industrialization may be slow, but
it is perfectly natural, indeed inevitable, for a country like India who wants to grow
up to be a major power someday.
Conclusion
In December 1995, India Today polled residents in nine major Indian cities on
matters of nuclear policy. Sixty-two per cent approved of nuclear testing for purposes
of developing India's nuclear weapons capability. Of these, 95 per cent felt that the
nuclear option was important in order to protect India against nuclear threats from
China and Pakistan, and 85 per cent felt that it was important to improve India's
international bargaining power generally. These, of course, are straightforward
functional concerns. But 83 per cent also gave another reason for India's nuclear
capability: 'enhancing our international status' .62 Indians recognized the symbolic
import of nuclear weapons, and distinguished this from more functional motivations.
We reach a similar conclusion. Our systematic analysis of India Today, India's
leading news magazine, suggests that India's material interests provide a central
impetus for the policy of military industrialization. Most references to India's
weapons production cite the country's enduring tensions with Pakistan and China.
59 Shekar Gupta, 'Shooting Ahead', India Today, 31 March 1988.
60 Raj Chengappa, 'A Testing Time', India Today, 31 August 1988.
61 Raj Chengappa, 'The Missile Man', India Today, 15 April1994.
62 'Opinion Poll: Yes to the Bomb', India Today, 31 December 1995.
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Many other statements refer to the enhancement of India's warfighting capacity in 
more general terms, especially the dangers involved in remaining dependent on 
foreigners for weapons and spare parts during wartime. Economic issues are 
frequently mentioned as well, including the beneficial effects of military industrial 
ization on the development of civilian industries and the foreign exchange to be 
saved with import substitution. 
Other benefits accruing from military industrialization appear to be primarily 
symbolic in Indian eyes. There are three closely interrelated yet distinguishable 
concerns in the public discourse that we consider symbolic. The first is that military 
industrialization is a means of asserting India's autonomy in international affairs. 
Guarding one's autonomy is, to be sure, standard fare among sovereign states? 
perhaps more so among some Third World states, or 'quasi-states', that otherwise 
lack the institutional capacity to promote and protect the welfare of their citizenry.63 
India does not fall into this latter category, but autonomy has nonetheless become 
emblematic of Indian statehood in the public discourse. The symbolic dimension 
is well captured by references to the 'swadeshi' spirit among defence industry 
personnel, and to 'swadeshi' bombs. Now autonomy in weapons production is 
certainly of great functional value, especially to protect against leverage that might 
otherwise be exercised by arms suppliers, but we have also found that references of 
this sort are relatively easy to separate from references to Indian autonomy as a 
symbol of Indian statehood. 
A second concern evident in the public discourse is India's international status 
and prestige. There is an apparent preoccupation with what it takes to become a 
member of the 
'superleague', 'rarefied strata', or 'exclusive club' of nation-states. 
Whether India has achieved that ranking or, if not, what still remains to be 
accomplished in the area of defence industrialization, is the subject of some debate. 
That India is destined for such greatness is generally taken for granted. Moreover, 
prestige is not sought for particular instrumental purposes. Short-term goals do not 
attach to statements regarding India's international status, current or immanent, nor 
do the sorts of longer-term messianic goals we might expect from a leading state in 
the nonaligned movement. There is no doubt an understanding that international 
status and prestige will afford India a degree of influence over the international rules 
of the game, and thus a recognition that military industrialization may allow India 
to exercise structural or hegemonic power (or check it). But such intentions do not 
find much expression in the public discourse.64 As a symbol of Indian statehood, 
international prestige looks to be primarily an end in itself. 
India's self-image is the third symbolic theme we identify in the public discourse. 
Of course, technically, references to India's autonomy and to its international status 
and prestige are also part of India's self-image, but there is something unique about 
the sorts of statements we group in this third category. There is, shall we say, less 
posturing involved and more self-reflection. References to India as a 'toddler' or as 
'coming of age', as well as to enhanced self-confidence, suggest that India still has a 
63 The notion of quasi-states and distinction between juridical and empirical statehood is discussed in 
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 64 On the different types of power?bargaining, structural, and hegemonic?potentially exercised by 
arms suppliers, see Keith Krause, 'Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American 
Arms Transfer Relationships, International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), pp. 313-36. 
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Many other statements refer to the enhancement of India's warfighting capacity in
more general terms, especially the dangers involved in remaining dependent on
foreigners for weapons and spare parts during wartime. Economic issues are
frequently mentioned as well, including the beneficial effects of military industrial-
ization on the development of civilian industries and the foreign exchange to be
saved with import substitution.
Other benefits accruing from military industrialization appear to be primarily
symbolic in Indian eyes. There are three closely interrelated yet distinguishable
concerns in the public discourse that we consider symbolic. The first is that military
industrialization is a means of asserting India's autonomy in international affairs.
Guarding one's autonomy is, to be sure, standard fare among sovereign states-
perhaps more so among some Third World states, or 'quasi-states', that otherwise
lack the institutional capacity to promote and protect the welfare of their citizenry.63
India does not fall into this latter category, but autonomy has nonetheless become
emblematic of Indian statehood in the public discourse. The symbolic dimension
is well captured by references to the 's adeshi' spirit among defence industry
personnel, and to 's adeshi' bombs. Now autonomy in weapons production is
certainly of great functional value, especially to protect against leverage that might
otherwise be exercised by arms suppliers, but we have also found that references of
this sort are relatively easy to separate from references to Indian autonomy as a
symbol of Indian statehood.
A second concern evident in the public discourse is India's international status
and prestige. There is an apparent preoccupation with what it takes to become a
ember of the 'superleague', 'rarefied strata', or 'exclusive club' of nation-states.
Whether India has achieved that ranking or, if not, what still remains to be
accomplished in the area of defence industrialization, is the subject of some debate.
That India is destined for such greatness is generally taken for granted. Moreover,
prestige is not sought for particular instrumental purposes. Short-term goals do not
attach to statements regarding India's international status, current or immanent, nor
do the sorts of longer-term messianic goals we might expect from a leading state in
the nonaligned movement. There is no doubt an understanding that international
status and prestige will afford India a degree of influence over the international rules
of the game, and thus a recognition that military industrialization may allow India
to exercise structural or hegemonic power (or check it). But such intentions do not
find much expression in the public discourse.64 As a symbol of Indian statehood,
international prestige looks to be primarily an end in itself
India's self-image is the third symbolic theme we identify in the public discourse.
Of course, technically, references to India's autonomy and to its international status
and prestige are also part of India's self-image, but there is something unique about
the sorts of statements we group in this third category. There is, shall we say, less
posturing involved and more self-reflection. References to India as a 'toddler' or as
'coming of age', as well as to enhanced self-confidence, suggest that India still has a
63 The notion of quasi-states and distinction between juridical and empirical statehood is discussed in
Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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way to go before entering 'adulthood'?that is, membership in the superleague or 
rarefied strata of nations. Such sentiments surely reflect more humility on the part of 
particular contributors to the public discourse, but they also stand out as echoing a 
key dimension of Indian identity discernible in some of Indira Gandhi's public 
statements and reminiscences. Whether they reflect 'true' Indian identity or whether 
Gandhi was projecting some of her own psychological insecurities onto the nation 
as a whole, as some of her biographers have suggested, is not an issue we are 
presently able to address. It will suffice to say that there is in Indian public discourse 
a linkage between military industrialization and maturity and self-confidence, 
desired symbols of Indian statehood. 
What do we conclude from this study? First, symbolic motivations for indigenous 
arms production in India are subject to systematic empirical observation. Our 
approach to measurement?identifying relevant excerpts in India Today?is a 
reasonable one, we believe, but it certainly invites refinement for purposes of 
rigorous empirical analysis. Second, the prominence of symbolic imagery in the 
Indian public discourse suggests that theoretical approaches like constructivism that 
focus on state identity formation might benefit from empirical research on the role 
of symbolism in state behaviour, since the particular themes we have identified each 
pertain to the meaning of Indian statehood. Although the results of our analysis 
suggest that symbolic motivations may constitute an important component of a full 
explanation for Indian military industrialization?a more important one than the 
realist approach allows?we have not provided a definitive test of this proposition. 
Because material and symbolic considerations both seem to be driving the same 
behaviour, subsequent empirical research must be designed to better evaluate their 
relative weightiness. We suspect that conclusions may vary depending on which 
indigenous arms programmes are scrutinized. 
In describing the symbolic forces driving Indian military industrialization, we 
have paid less attention to the forces behind the symbolic imagery itself. In our 
discussion of relevant international relations theory, we did point out that realists 
and constructivists alike identify a socializing process in world politics. It could be 
that the preoccupation with symbols of statehood is most pronounced for relatively 
recent entrants into the society of states. After the first round of nuclear tests in 
May 1998, the Indian government announced that 'Succeeding generations of 
Indians would rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear 
options have been passed on to them this the 50th year of our independence'.65 Not 
only was India now a member of an exclusive club, it was also a youthful member. 
Whether young states are more taken with symbolism than old states is a worthwhile 
question for further comparative research. 
Sources of symbolic imagery might also be domestic, and this represents another 
important question for comparative research. References to self-confidence and the 
confidence-building effects of successful indigenization may be partly rooted in 
Indian history and domestic culture. Certainly there can be no doubt that military 
industrial accomplishments are paraded for domestic as well as international 
65 Press Statement, 11 May 1998, <http://wwwindianembassy.org/pic/prmayll98.htm> (30 May 1998). 
For a discussion of the debates and decisions that have shaped India's nuclear programme, see Sumit 
Ganguly, 'India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear 
Weapons Program', International Security, 23 (1999), pp. 148-77. 
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way to go before entering 'adulthood'-that is, membership in the superleague or
rarefied strata of nations. Such sentiments surely reflect more humility on the part of
particular contributors to the public discourse, but they also stand out as echoing a
key dimension of Indian identity discernible in some of Indira Gandhi's public
statements and reminiscences. Whether they reflect 'true' Indian identity or whether
Gandhi was projecting some of her own psychological insecurities onto the nation
as a whole, as some of her biographers have suggested, is not an issue we are
presently able to address. It will suffice to say that there is in Indian public discourse
a linkage between military industrialization and maturity and self-confidence,
desired symbols of Indian statehood.
What do we conclude from this study? First, symbolic motivations for indigenous
arms production in India are subject to systematic empirical observation. Our
approach to measurement-identifying relevant excerpts in India Today-is a
reasonable one, we believe, but it certainly invites refinement for purposes of
rigorous empirical analysis. Second, the prominence of symbolic imagery in the
Indian public discourse suggests that theoretical approaches like constructivism that
focus on state identity formation might benefit from empirical research on the role
of symbolism in state behaviour, since the particular themes we have identified each
pertain to the meaning of Indian statehood. Although the results of our analysis
suggest that symbolic motivations may constitute an important component of a full
explanation for Indian military industrialization-a more important one than the
realist approach allows-we have not provided a definitive test of this proposition.
Because material and symbolic considerations both seem to be driving the same
behaviour, subsequent empirical research must be designed to better evaluate their
relative weightiness. We suspect that conclusions may vary depending on which
indigenous arms programmes are scrutinized.
In describing the symbolic forces driving Indian military industrialization, we
have paid less attention to the forces behind the symbolic imagery itself. In our
discussion of relevant international relations theory, we did point out that realists
and constructivists alike identify a socializing process in world politics. It could be
that the preoccupation with symbols of statehood is most pronounced for relatively
recent entrants into the society of states. After the first round of nuclear tests in
May 1998, the Indian government announced that 'Succeeding generations of
Indians would rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear
options have been passed on to them this the 50th year of our independence'.65 Not
only was India now a member of an exclusive club, it was also a youthful member.
Whether young states are more taken with symbolism than old states is a worthwhile
question for further comparative research.
Sources of symbolic imagery might also be domestic, and this represents another
important question for comparative research. References to self-confidence and the
confidence-building effects of successful indigenization may be partly rooted in
Indian history and domestic culture. Certainly there can be no doubt that military-
industrial accomplishments are paraded for domestic as well as international
65 Press Statement, 11 May 1998, <http://wwwindianembassy.org/pic/prmayI198.htm> (30 May 1998).
For a discussion of the debates and decisions that have shaped India's nuclear programme, see Sumit
Ganguly, 'India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear
Weapons Program', International Security, 23 (1999), pp. 148-77.
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audiences. Where and how global and domestic culture interact to produce the 
symbolic imagery that drives arms production in India, or any other state, represents 
an interesting and challenging line of inquiry. We have tried to demonstrate that 
symbolic imagery is manifest in public discourse, and is measurable. Empirical 
observation is probably not a serious impediment to rigorous research on the role of 
symbolism in either state identity formation or state behaviour. 
Appendix 
In this article we have tried to identify the symbolic imagery present in Indian public 
discourse surrounding indigenous arms production, and we believe that there is no 
better source than India Today for our purposes. But aware of the dangers of relying 
on this single source, we have consulted the online editions of Frontline, The 
Hindustan Times, and The Hindu to see if a similar picture emerges from these 
publications. Frontline is a fortnightly news magazine with a general readership, 
though a somewhat smaller one than India Today's. The Hindustan Times and The 
Hindu are independent daily newspapers, and are naturally more inclined to reach 
the lower-middle strata of Indian society than the news magazines. We were 
interested in (1) whether the same rationales for Indian military industrialization 
find expression in these sources, and (2) whether the frequency with which they 
appear is comparable to their relative prominence in India Today. For each news 
source, Table A shows the number of relevant articles in which each rationale 
appears and the number of articles as a percentage of all relevant articles. 
Table A. Comparing India Today with other Indian news sources. 
India Today Frontline Hindustan Times The Hindu 
(May 77-Apr 99) (Aug 97-Apr 99) (Nov 97-Apr 99) (Jan 96-Apr 99) 
Rationale # % # % # % # % 
Symbolic 68 50 4 80 9 41 9 53
National Autonomy 35 26 2 40 5 23  18 
International Status 39 29 2 40 3 14 3 18 
Self-image 34 25 1 20 2 93 18 
Threat from Rival 91 66 2 40 7 32 6 35 
Regional Security 64 47 1 20 5 23 3 18 
Arms Dependence 21 15 0 0 6 27 318 
Industrial Development 31 23 0 0 3 14 6 35 
Foreign Exchange 45 33 1 20 2 9 2 12 
Total Articles 136 5 22 17 
Note: For each source, the first column shows the number of articles in which a particular rationale 
for domestic arms production is mentioned at least once, while the second column shows the 
percentage of all relevant articles in which that rationale appears. Relevant articles are those 
devoted in full or in part to the topic of Indian arms production. The online editions of Frontline, 
The Hindustan Times, and The Hindu were analysed, and are located at the following web 
addresses: Frontline, www.the-hindu.com/fline/; The Hindustan Times, www.hindustantimes.com; 
The Hindu, www.the-hindu.com. 
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audiences. Where and how global and domestic culture interact to produce the
symbolic imagery that drives arms production in India, or any other state, represents
an interesting and challenging line of inquiry. We have tried to demonstrate that
symbolic imagery is manifest in public discourse, and is measurable. Empirical
observation is probably not a serious impediment to rigorous research on the role of
symbolism in either state identity formation or state behaviour.
Appendix
In this article we have tried to identify the symbolic imagery present in Indian public
discourse surrounding indigenous arms production, and we believe that there is no
better source than India Today for our purposes. But aware of the dangers of relying
on this single source, we have consulted the online editions of Frontline, The
Hindustan Times, and The Hindu to s e if a similar picture emerges from these
publications. Frontline is a fortnightly news magazine with a general readership,
though a somewhat smaller one than India Today's. The Hindustan Times and The
Hindu are independent daily newspapers, and are naturally more inclined to reach
the lower-middle strata of Indian society than the news magazines. We were
interested in (1) whether the same rationales for Indian military industrialization
find expression in these sources, and (2) whether the frequency with which they
appear is comparable to their relative prominence in India Today. For each news
source, Table A shows the number of relevant articles in which each rationale
appears and the number of articles as a percentage of all relevant articles.
Table A. Comparing India Today with other Indian news sources.
India Today Frontline Hindustan Times The Hindu
(May 77-Apr 99) (Aug 97-Apr 99) (Nov 97-Apr 99) (Jan 96-Apr 99)
Rationale # 0/0 # 0/0 # 0/0 # 0/0
Symbolic 68 50 4 80 9 41 9 53
National Autonomy 35 26 2 40 5 23 3 18
International Status 39 29 2 40 3 14 3 18
Self-Image 34 25 1 20 2 9 3 18
Threat from Rival 91 66 2 40 7 32 6 35
Regional Security 64 47 1 20 5 23 3 18
Arms Dependence 21 15 0 0 6 27 3 18
Industrial Development 31 23 0 0 3 14 6 35
Foreign Exchange 45 33 1 20 2 9 2 12
Total Articles 136 5 22 17
Note: For each source, the first column shows the number of articles in which a particular rationale
for domestic arms production is mentioned at least once, while the second column shows the
percentage of all relevant articles in which that rationale appears. Relevant articles are those
devoted in full or in part to the topic of Indian arms production. The online editions of Frontline,
The Hindustan Times, and The Hindu were analysed, and are located at the following web
addresses: Frontline, www.the-hindu.comlfline/; The Hindustan Times, www.hindustantimes.com;
The Hindu, ww.the-hindu.com.
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Generally speaking, although the match is not exact, there is nothing in these 
results to suggest that India Today (or any of the other three sources) is providing a 
glimpse into Indian public discourse that is at odds with the others. The whole range 
of motivations we identify from India Today also appears in Frontline, The 
Hindustan Times, and The Hindu, and symbolic motivations feature as prominently 
as they do in India Today. Although the online editions span a much shorter period 
than our analysis of 22 years of India Today, we do not suspect that our conclusions 
would be any different if we were to conduct a more exhaustive examination. 
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